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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
Union Oil Company of California is unaware of any parties other than those 
identified in the caption of this Opening Brief of Petitioner. 
1. The Petitioner, Union Oil Company of California, shall be referred to herein 
"Unocal." 
2. The Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, shall be referred to herein as 
the "Commission." 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision (the 
"Final Decision") of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") issued on 
December 24, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(e)(ii). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. The Prospective Relief Declaration in the ExxonMobilDecision Appears 
Erroneous in Light of the Facts in the Unocal Appeal. 
1. Did the Commission err when it refused to recognize the distinctions between 
this case and the ExxonMobilcase and determined that the prospective relief declaration 
barred the application of ExxonMobil'to the facts in this case? R. 37. 
Standard of review: "Interpreting case law presents a question of law. . . . 
Accordingly, we review the [Commission's] interpretation of our ruling . . . for correctness" 
Houghton v. Deft of Health, 2005 UT 63, \ 32,125 P.3d 860 (Utah 2005); "Although we are 
normally bound by our own precedent, we may overrule it where 'the decision is clearly 
erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable."' 
Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, U 20, 590 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, quoting State v. Menkes, 889 
P.2d 393, 399 n. 3 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the Commission err when it concluded that the prospective effect 
doctrine was properly invoked by the ExxonMobil Court even though the ExxonMobil 
decision did not overrule clear past precedent on which the litigants had previously relied? 
R. 165. 
1 
Standard of review: The Commission's interpretation of case law is reviewed for 
correctness. Houghton, 2005 UT 63, \ 32 (Utah 2005). This Court may overrule its own 
precedent "where cthe decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to 
render the prior decision inapplicable.'" Munson, 2007 UT 91, f 20. 
B. Errors in the Commission's Interpretation of the ExxonMobildecision. 
3. Did the Commission err when it interpreted the ExxonMobilCourt's 
declaration that the prospective relief limitation applies to "other parties who may have 
refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax 
Commission" to mean that the Auditing Division could issue new severance tax deficiency 
assessments nearly one year after ExxonMobil was decided which were based on the statutory 
interpretation rejected by the ExxonMobil Court? R. 37. 
Standard of review: "Interpreting case law presents a question of law. . . . 
Accordingly, we review the [Commission's] interpretation of our ruling . . . for correctness." 
Houghton, 2005 UT 63,132 (Utah 2005). 
4. Did the Commission deprive Unocal of a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
when it affirmed the second deficiency assessment even though it was not "pending" during 
ExxonMobil and was based on valuation practices which had been rejected by the ExxonMobil 
court? R. 167-168. 
Standard of review: This Court reviews interpretations of case law for correctness. 
Houghton, 2005 UT 63, f 32. 
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C. Errors in the Commission's Interpretations of Severance Tax Provisions. 
5. Did the Commission err when it sustained the Division's deficiency 
assessments which valued oil and gas at the point of sale at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant, 
even though the severance tax statutes impose the tax on oil or gas when it is "transported 
from the field" and the Commission found that the oil and gas had already been "transported 
from the field" before it reached the Lisbon Plant? R. 39-40. 
Standard of review: "As questions of law, we review the Tax Commission's 
interpretations of the various statutory provisions implicated in this matter for correctness, 
according the Tax Commission's interpretations no deference." ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53, 
1j 1, 86 P.3d at 709, citing Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm\ 2002 UT 112, \ 14, 61 P.3d 
1053; Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b). 
6. Did the Commission err when it interpreted the third statutory valuation 
method which requires "consideration of information relevant in valuing like-quality oil or 
gas at the well in the same field or nearby fields" to require the use of posted prices for 
sweet oil even though the oil in the Lisbon field is sour oil? R. 41. 
Standard of review: Questions of law (statutory interpretation) are reviewed for 
correctness. ExxonMobil Corp., 2003 UT 53 f 1. 
1. Did the Commission err when it concluded that federal regulations superseded 
statutory definitions of allowable deductions under the net back method? R. 44-45. 
Standard of review: Questions of law (statutory interpretation) are reviewed for 
correctness. ExxonMobil Corp., 2003 UT 53 \ 1. 
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8. Did the Commission err when it held that the annual exemption for "the first 
$50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells" constituted a single exemption for a 
field, rather than an annual exemption for each well? R. 48-50. 
Standard of review: Questions of law (statutory interpretation) are reviewed for 
correctness. ExxonMobil Corp., 2003 UT 53 ^J1. 
9. Did the Commission ignore plain statutory language when it upheld the 
Division's decision to prorate the exemption for 1999 based on Unocal's mid-year sale of its 
interest in the Lisbon Unit, even though the statutory exemption is for "the first $50,000 
annuallyin gross value of each well or wells"? R. 50. 
Standard of review: Questions of law (statutory interpretation) are reviewed for 
correctness. ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53 If 1. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
A. Constitutional Provisions. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
B. Statutes. 
Each person owning an interest, working interest, royalty interest, payments out of 
production, or any other interest, in oil or gas produced from a well in the state, or in 
the proceeds of the production, shall pay to the state a severance tax equal to 4% of 
the value, at the well, of the oil or gas produced, saved, and sold or transported from 
the field where the substance was produced. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a) (1999).1 
1
 All citations to the Utah Code contained herein are to the 1999 version of the Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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No tax is imposed upon: 
(a) the first $50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells as defined in 
this part, to be prorated among the owners in proportion to their respective interests 
in the production or in the proceeds of the production. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5402(2). 
(1) For purposes of computing the severance tax, the value of oil or gas at the well is 
the value established under an arm's-length contract for the purchase of production at 
the well, or in the absence of such a contract, by the value established in accordance 
with the first applicable of the following methods: 
(a) the value at the well established under a non-arm's-length contract for the 
purchase of production at the well, provided that the value is equivalent to the value 
received under comparable arm's-length contracts for purchases or sales of like-
quality oil or gas in the same field; 
(b) the value at the well determined by consideration of information relevant 
in valuing like-quality oil and gas at the well in the same field or nearby fields or areas 
such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-length spot sales, or other reliable 
public sources of price or market information; 
(c) the value established using the net-back method as defined in Section 
59-5-101. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-5-103. 
"Net-back method" means a method for calculating the fair market value of oil or gas 
at the well. Under this method, costs of transportation, not to exceed 50% of the 
value of the oil or gas, and processing shall be deducted from the proceeds received 
for the oil or gas and any extracted or processed products, or from the value of the oil 
or gas or any extracted or processed products at the first point at which the fair-
market value for those products is determined by a sale pursuant to an arm's-length 
contract or comparison to other sales of those products. Processing and 
transportation costs shall be deducted only from the value of the processed or 
transported product. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(7). 
"Processing costs" means the reasonable actual costs of processing gas. Processing 
costs are determined by an arm's-length contract and are the actual costs. Where 
processing costs are not determined by an arm's-length contract, including those 
situations where the producer performs the processing for himself, the actual costs of 
processing shall be those reasonable costs associated with the actual operating and 
maintenance expenses, overhead direcdy attributable and allocable to the operation 
5 
and maintenance, and either depreciation and a return on undepreciated capital 
investment, or a cost equal to a return on the investment in the processing facilities as 
determined by the tax commission. The tax commission shall adopt rules to 
implement this definition, and may adopt federal regulations where applicable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(11). 
"Transportation costs" means the reasonable actual costs of transporting oil or gas 
products from the well to the point of sale except the transportation allowance 
deduction may not exceed 50% of the value of the oil or gas. Transportation costs 
determined by an arm's-length contract are the actual costs. Where transportation 
costs are not determined by an arm's-length contract, including those situations where 
the producer performs the actual costs of transportation service for himself, the actual 
costs of transportation shall be those reasonable costs associated with the actual 
operating and maintenance expenses, overhead costs direcdy attributable and 
allocable to the operation and maintenance, and either depreciation and a return on 
undepreciated capital investment, or a cost equal to a return on the investment in the 
transportation system as determined by the commission. The tax commission shall 
adopt rules to implement this definition, and may adopt federal regulations where 
applicable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(17). 
£CWell or wells" means any extractive means from which oil or gas is produced or 
extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20). 
C. Administrative Rules. 
For those who are required to report and pay the tax on a quarterly basis, the annual 
exemption taken for each quarterly installment shall be the lesser of one-fourth of the 
annual exemption, or an amount that reduces the installment to zero. 
Utah Admin. Rules R.865-150.1.D. 
6 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This is an appeal of an administrative proceeding before the Commission concerning 
three statutory notices issued to Union Oil Company of California ("Unocal") by the 
Auditing Division (the "Division") which asserted severance tax and conservation fee 
deficiencies. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On December 8, 2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice asserting a severance 
tax deficiency to Unocal for the period January 1,1994, through December 31, 1997 ("First 
Audit Period"). R. 871-890. Unocal filed a timely Petition for Redetermination of that 
deficiency assessment. R. 864. By order dated December 30, 2002, the Commission granted 
a stay of the appeal pending the Commission's resolution of a severance tax appeal filed by 
ExxonMobil. R. 797. 
The stay continued in force throughout ExxonMobil's appeal of the Commission's 
final decision to the Utah Supreme Court. Unocal filed an amicus brief in the ExxonMobil 
matter. On November 25, 2003, this Court ruled in favor of ExxonMobil on the issue of 
statutory interpretation. The Court declined to give full retroactive effect to its decision. 
Unocal and other amici parties filed a Petition for Rehearing on December 9, 2003 on 
the prospective relief limitation issue. On December 10, 2003, the Commission filed a 
Motion to Strike. By Order dated January 20, 2004, the Court denied the Petition for 
Rehearing. 
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On October 5, 2004, the Division issued Statutory Notices alleging conservation fees 
and severance tax deficiencies against Unocal for the period from January 1, 1998 through 
December 31,1999 ("Second Audit Period"). R. 1551-1556 (conservation fee), R. 2014-
2024 (severance tax). Unocal filed timely appeals. R. 1544, R. 2007. 
Unocal's appeals were consolidated and a Formal Hearing was held on March 27, 28 
and 29, 2007. R. 10. The Commission issued its Final Decision on December 24, 2007. Id. 
On January 23, 2008, Unocal filed its Petition for Review. 
C. Commission's Disposition of the Administrative Proceeding. 
1. In its Final Decision, the Commission concluded that the Utah Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the severance tax provisions in ExxonMobil did not apply to 
Unocal's appeals despite significant factual differences between the ExxonMobilcase and 
Unocal's appeal. R. 53, f 3. 
2. The Commission also concluded that even though the ExxonMobil Count held 
that its decision would only apply retroactively to parties which had "refund requests, 
deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission," the 
prospective relief limitation should also be applied to deficiency assessments which were not 
pending'at the time ExxonMobil WAS decided. R. 28-29. 
3. Commissioner Dixon dissented from this part of the Final Decision, stating: 
In ExxonMobil, the Court stated that except for the taxpayer in that case, its 
ruling would not apply to 'refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar 
matters pending before the Tax Commission' (emphasis added). I am 
persuaded that the word 'pending' is critical in determining those matters to 
which the Commission may apply the Court's ruling. I interpret the Court's 
language as requiring the application of its ruling to matters that were not yet 
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under appeal or for which a deficiency assessment had not been issued on 
November 25, 2003, regardless of whether the taxes concerned a period prior 
to this date. Otherwise, the Division could assess a deficiency for a prior tax 
period after November 25, 2003, without regard to the Court's guidance in 
ExxonMobil and without the taxpayer having a meaningful opportunity to 
contest the Division's action. 
R. 56. 
4. The Commission refused to find error in the assessment even though it found 
(1) that the Lisbon Plant was not located on the Lisbon Unit, R. 18, f 40, and (2) that the 
Division acknowledged that the statute required the valuation of oil and gas before it was 
transported off the unit R. 40. The Commission held that the prospective relief limitation 
in ExxonMobil required the Commission to uphold the Division's ^it-ExxonMobil valuation 
practices and concluded that plant location was not critical to the Division's pit-ExxonMobil 
practices. R. 44, ^ 2. 
5. Commissioner Dixon dissented from this portion of the Final Decision as 
well, stating: 
Although the Division's testimony on this point appeared, at times, 
contradictory, I am persuaded that the pit-ExxonMobil practice was to value 
oil and gas at the point it left the unit or field. Because Unocal's oil and gas 
was processed after it left the Lisbon Unit, I believe that the Division's 
valuation of these products at a point after processing is erroneous, even if the 
court's guidance in ExxonMobil is not considered. 
R. 57. 
6. The Commission also interpreted the ExxonMobil decision to allow the 
Division to value oil at the point of sale even though the statute requires the Division to use 
posted prices of "like-quality oil or gas at the well" to determine value. The Commission 
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approved the use of the sweet oil postings because Unocal's oil "was in a similar 'sweet* state 
. . . at the point of eventual sale." R. 41. 
7. The Commission also held that the statutory deductions for processing costs 
and transportation costs were subject to the limitations set forth in the federal regulations. 
R. 44-45, 53-54. 
8. With regard to the statutory well exemptions, the Commission interpreted the 
exemption for "the first $50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells" to provide a 
single well exemption for an entire field, and concluded that the exemption was properly 
prorated when Unocal sold it interest in the Lisbon Unit in mid-1999. R. 49-50, 54. 
9. The Commission permitted some additional deductions for Unocal's 
calculations of the value of NGLs for the Second Audit Period. R. 50. 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts, 
10. The audits at issue in this appeal involve oil and gas production from the 
Lisbon Unit located in San Juan County, Utah. Unocal was the designated Unit Operator of 
the Lisbon Unit at all times relevant to this appeal. R. 11. 
11. The Lisbon Unit is comprised of only federal and State of Utah oil and gas 
leases. R. 12 at % 10, 665. 
12. The Lisbon Plant was constructed at a cost of more than $89,000,000 in order 
to process oil and gas from the Lisbon Unit The Lisbon Plant is not located within the legal 
parameters of the Lisbon Unit. Therefore all oil and gas transported to the Lisbon Plant has 
been transported from the field before it is processed. R. 17. 
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13. The oil and gas produced from the Mississippian Pool within the Lisbon Unit 
was sour oil and gas which contained significant contaminants including hydrogen sulfide, 
carbon dioxide, and nitrogen. R. 18. 
14. For the First Audit Period (Jan. 1, 1994 - Dec. 31, 1997), Unocal initially 
calculated its severance taxes on the oil and gas produced from Lisbon Unit based on the 
value of the oil and gas at the point of sale. R. 21-22. Unocal later concluded it had 
misinterpreted the severance tax provisions and filed a Severance Tax refund claim using the 
net-back valuation method to value the oil and gas production "at the well." Unocal 
requested a refund of $1,107,504. R. 22-23. 
15. On October 26, 1998, the Commission notified Unocal that it had reviewed 
Unocal's account and had determined that Unocal was entitled to the requested refund in the 
total amount, including interest, of $1,217,609.05. R. 23. 
16. On December 8, 2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice for the First 
Audit Period that asserted a severance tax deficiency of $1,082,951.70, plus interest. R. 24. 
The Division used contract prices for sales of the oil and gas at the tailgate of the plant as a 
starting point to value all of the oil and gas and used the net-back method to value natural 
gas liquids ("NGLs") with a limitation on the processing cost deduction of 2/3 of the value 
oftheNGLs. Id 
17. For each tax year, the combined taxable value of the oil, gas, and NGLs was 
reduced by an annual exemption approximately equal to the statutory annual exemption for a 
single well ($50,000), less the proportion of exempt royalties (0.125000). Id. 
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18. Unocal appealed the deficiency assessment However, by Order dated 
Dec. 30, 2002, the Commission issued a stay of that appeal pending its final decision in the 
ExxonMobil matter. R. 25. 
19. During the Second Audit Period (Jan. 1,1998 - Dec. 31, 1999), except for the 
first quarter, Unocal calculated its severance tax liability using the net-back method. R. 80. 
20. On November 25, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in 
ExxonMobil v. Utah State Tax Comm% 2003 UT 53, 86 P.3d 706, providing an interpretation 
of portions of the severance tax provisions. The Court rejected the Commission's argument 
that the severance tax provisions required severance tax to be based on the value of oil and 
gas at the point of sale. The ExxonMobil Court applied well-established principles of 
statutory interpretation and concluded that the statutory language "at the well" and where 
"production is complete" "contemplates valuation in the immediate vicinity of the point of 
removal from the earth." 2003 UT 53 U 20. 
21. The Court declined to give full retroactive effect to its interpretation in light of 
concerns raised by amici Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund and Uintah Basin Revitalization 
Fund that the retroactive application of its determination "could result in large refunds of 
taxes already collected and spent by governmental entities." Id, |^ 23. The Court 
acknowledged that "the full breadth and depth of the impact [was] not immediately apparent 
from the record." Id. Despite the absence of a record, the Court concluded the impact 
"would be substantial" and "would pose a great burden on the amici revitalization funds and 
other relatively small governmental entities operating on correspondingly small budgets." Id. 
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22. The Court held that its prospective relief limitation would apply to "other 
parties who may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending 
before the Tax Commission." Id. at J^ 24 (emphasis added). 
23. Nearly one year after the ExxonMobildecision, the Division issued a deficiency 
assessment to Unocal for the Second Audit Period. R. 26. The alleged severance tax 
deficiency, including interest and a ten percent penalty, totaled $795,311.99. R. 27. 
24. The Division calculated the alleged deficiency for severance tax on oil by using 
posted prices for sweet oil produced at the Giant's Paradox Basin. R. 27. The sour oil 
produced from the Mississippian Pool was not of like quality to the sweet oil produced from 
the Giant's Paradox Basin. R. 27. The value of gas and NGLs was calculated using the 
contract sales price at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant, and applying a limited processing cost 
allowance for NGLs. Id. 
25. At the same time the Division also issued a conservation fee assessment for 
$47,709.72. R. 26. The amount of the conservation fee is tied direcdy to the assessed 
severance tax deficiency. R. 26. 
26. For tax year 1998, the combined taxable value of the oil, gas, and NGLs was 
reduced by an annual exemption in the amount of $43,750.05. R. 27. 
27. For tax year 1999, the combined taxable value of the oil, gas, and NGLs was 
reduced by an annual exemption in the amount of $21,875.03. Id. According to the 
Division, the available exemption was reduced by 50% because Unocal was operator only 
untilJuneof!999. Id. 
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28. Unocal timely appealed both statutory notices. Id. The Formal Hearing on 
these appeals took place before the Utah Tax Commission on March 27-29, 2007. R. 10. 
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T 
This appeal concerns the taxpayer's right to obtain relief from deficiency assessments 
which were issued because the taxpayer correcdy calculated its severance taxes in compliance 
with specific statutory provisions which require valuation "in the immediate vicinity of the 
well with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state.'5 ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53, 
124. 
For a six-year period, Unocal calculated its severance tax liability as required by the 
Utah severance tax statutes. The Division issued deficiency assessments totaling more than 
$2.2 million which were upheld by the Commission because this Court, when it explained 
that Utah law requires valuation of oil and gas in the immediate vicinity of the well, also held 
that the statutory interpretation could not be retroactively applied to "parties who may have 
refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax 
Commission." Id. 
This appeal demonstrates why the ExxonMobilCourt's ruling on prospectivity should 
be overturned. Not only is it inequitable to force taxpayers to pay millions of dollars in 
severance taxes under an interpretation of the severance tax laws which has been rejected by 
this Court, but the factors which compelled this Court to limit the application of ExxonMobil 
have no application to the facts of this case. 
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If this Court does not overrule the prospective relief limitation in ExxonMobil, then 
there are several other grounds for reversing the Commission's decision. For example, the 
Second Deficiency Assessment, which was issued subsequent to the ExxonMobil decision, 
was based on the interpretation of the severance tax laws which was rejected by this Court 
and was issued despite the fact that the ExxonMobilCourt did not make the prospective relief 
limitation applicable to deficiency assessments which did not even exist at the time the 
decision was issued. The Commission also erred when it upheld the Division's assessments 
even though the Division admitted that it's assessment did not comply with the statutory 
requirement that oil and gas be valued when it is "transported from the field" inasmuch as 
the oil and gas produced in the Lisbon Field was transported from the field before it reached 
the Lisbon Unit. 
Remaining issues of statutory interpretation concern whether the valuation 
methodology allowing the use of posted prices for "like quality oil and gas" permits the use 
of posted prices for "sweet" oil to value "sour" oil; whether the Commission erred when it 
held that specific statutory net-back definitions only applied when federal regulations were 
silent, even when those federal regulations conflicted with plain statutory language; and 
whether the exemption for "the first $50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells" is 
really a field exemption and whether it can be prorated when a producer sells its interest long 
after "the first $50,000" worth of oil and gas has been produced. The Commission erred in 
its ruling on these issues when it disregarded well-established principles of statutory 
interpretation and did not give effect to the plain meaning of Utah's severance tax laws. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. T H E FACTS OF THIS CASE DEMONSTRATE WHY T H E 
EXXONMOBIL COURT'S PROSPECTIVE RELIEF LIMITATION 
SHOULD BE REEXAMINED. 
The ExxonMobil Coutt provided the correct interpretation of the severance tax laws at 
issue in this appeal. However, the Commission refused to apply that interpretation to 
Unocal's appeal because the ExxonMobil Court gave its decision limited retroactive effect — 
excluding its application to all taxpayers except ExxonMobil. There are significant factual 
differences between this appeal and the ExxonMobil case which were either unrecognized or 
unforeseen by the ExxonMobil Court and which demonstrate that the ExxonMobil Court's 
decision to impose a prospective relief limitation in that case wras error. 
This Court recendy addressed the appropriateness of overruling a decision when that 
decision was made without thorough analysis of the issue and subsequent events 
demonstrated that the decision was clearly erroneous. In Munson, 2007 UT 91, the district 
court had barred the plaintiffs medical expert from testifying on the grounds that statutory 
confidentiality requirements had been violated. The district court's decision was based on 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1999), wherein the 
appellant had successfully argued in her reply brief to this Court that the appellee's 
attachment of a notice of intent to his appellate brief violated statutory requirements of 
confidentiality. Based on the Maret decision, the district court concluded that Munson's 
disclosure to her expert witness of documents obtained in proceedings before a prelitigation 
panel violated statutory confidentiality requirements and disqualified the expert. This Court 
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reviewed the facts of the case and observed that the disclosed documents had been created 
by Munson's own counsel and consulting expert and, therefore, Munson was free to disclose 
those documents and waive any privilege attached thereto. The Court held: 
Although we are normally bound by our own precedent, we may overrule it 
where "the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to 
render the prior decision inapplicable/7 
Id., 2007 UT 91, f 20, quoting State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Court explained that the precedential value of the prior 
decision on confidentiality of the prelitigation material was minimal in light of the 
circumstances which gave rise to that ruling: 
Our decision to overrule the last paragraph of Maret is supported by the fact 
that it "is not the most weighty of precedents." Id. at 399. The paragraph at 
issue was appended to our opinion in Maret almost as an afterthought Indeed, 
we devoted only a single paragraph to our analysis of the issue, an analysis 
consisting almost entirely of a conclusory sentence asserting that because the 
notice of intent is part of the proceedings, it must be kept confidential. This 
lack of analysis, combined with the unique way in which the issue was 
presented, reduces the precedential value of the applicable language. Unlike 
the vast majority of cases in which we either affirm or assign error to a 
decision by a lower court, in Maret viz were asked to exercise our inherent 
jurisdiction over the proceedings before us to impose sanctions for an act that 
occurred during briefing. Because of this unique procedural posture, the issue 
did not benefit from the focus and refinement afforded issues actually litigated 
in the lower courts. Moreover, because the issue was first raised in a reply 
brief, we were not able to benefit from any adversarial briefing of the issue. 
We accordingly conclude that it is appropriate to overrule the last paragraph of 
our opinion in Doe v. Maret. 
Id, 2007 UT 91,1J21. 
This case presents a similar dilemma where precedent with unforeseen ramifications 
was created by last minute arguments on an issue which "did not benefit from the focus and 
17 
refinement afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts." Id. As a result, the Court's 
unprecedented decision to apply a prospective relief limitation to a matter of statutory 
interpretation has led to substantial inequities which were not fully considered and were likely 
not foreseen by the ExxonMobil Court. 
A. The Prospective Relief Limitation Issue "Did Not Benefit from the 
Focus and Refinement Afforded Issues Actually Litigated in Lower 
Courts." 
ExxonMobil operated oil and gas wells in the Aneth Field in southeastern Utah. 
From 1993 through 1998, ExxonMobil had calculated its severance taxes based on the value 
of the oil and gas at the point of sale. In 1999, ExxonMobil filed severance tax refund 
requests asserting that it had overpaid its severance taxes. The Division denied the refund 
request and ExxonMobil appealed that decision to the Commission. The Commission 
ultimately interpreted severance tax statutes to require valuation of oil and gas at the point of 
sale. ExxonMobil appealed the Commission's decision. 
The Navajo Revitalization Fund and the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund (the 
"Revitalization Funds") jointly filed an amicus brief wherein they argued that if this Court 
reversed the Commission's decision, the decision should be applied prospectively to avoid 
"catastrophic budget and solvency problems."2 Neither the Commission, nor the Division of 
2
 The Aneth Field is located on Navajo lands and, under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119, 
the Navajo Revitalization Fund was entitled to 33% of the severance taxes collected from 
ExxonMobil's wells for the last 18 months of the six years for which refunds were requested. 
The statute requiring payment of severance taxes to the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund 
went into effect on July 1, 1997. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119. The fund receives 33% of 
severance taxes collected on wells located on Navajo Nation land which began producing on 
or before June 30, 1996, and 80% of severance taxes for the newer wells. The Uintah Basin 
Revitalization Fund is entirely funded by severance tax payments for wells on Ute Indian 
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Oil, Gas & Mining and the Utah Association of Counties ("UAC"), which also filed an 
amicus briefs, ever requested or discussed a prospective relief limitation in their briefs. 
The ExxonMobil Court rejected the Commission's interpretation of the severance tax 
statutes and held that the statutes required valuation "in the immediate vicinity of the well, 
with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53 Tf 24. 
However, the Court limited the application of its ruling to ExxonMobil, declaring that "as to 
all but ExxonMobil, the rule announced today is to have prospective application only." Id. at 
1123. 
The Court acknowledged that the evidence on which it based this unprecedented 
decision was scant when it admitted that "the full breadth and depth of the impact is not 
immediately apparent from the record." Id., % 23. Despite the admitted paucity of evidence, 
the Court concluded the prospective effect limitation was necessary to protect the solvency 
of "the amici revitalization funds and other relatively small governmental entities" and "to 
avoid administrative hardship . . . caused by retroactive application of rules contrary to those 
relied on by the taxing authorities." Id. The Court's concern for the solvency of the "amici 
funds and other relatively small governmental entities" does not apply in this appeal because 
(a) Unocal's wells are not on Indian lands; (b) there are no other "relatively small 
governmental entities" which were or would be direcdy impacted by the ExxonMobil 
decision; and (c) revenue concerns are not implicated by deficiency proceedings. Likewise, 
lands within Duchesne and Uintah Counties. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-116. Because 
ExxonMobil's wells were in Aneth Field, in San Juan County, this fund had no financial stake 
in ExxonMobil's refund action. Nevertheless, it joined the amicus brief filed by the Navajo 
Nation Revitalization Fund. 
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the Court's desire to "avoid administrative hardship . . . caused by retroactive application of 
rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities" is unfounded as demonstrated by 
facts in this case inasmuch as (a) the ExxonMobil decision did not announce a new rule of 
law, and (b) the issuance of refunds causes no more administrative hardship than the 
issuance of deficiency assessments. 
The distinctions represented by this appeal are so significant that they "render the 
prior decision [on prospective relief in ExxonMobil inapplicable." Munson, 2007 UT 91, 
p. 20. 
B. The Facts of this Appeal Demonstrate That the Court Misapprehended 
the Impact General Application of the ExxonMobil Decision Would 
Have on the Solvency of "Amici Funds and Other Relatively Small 
Governmental Entities." 
1. Revitalization Funds do not benefit from Unocal's severance 
taxes because Unocal's wells are not on Indian lands. 
The ExxonMobil Court applied the prospective effect doctrine based on its "desire to 
protect the solvency of governmental entities." 2003 UT 53 \ 23. The only entities 
specifically discussed in the ExxonMobil decision were the Revitalization Funds. However, 
the Revitalization Funds only have an interest in severance taxes paid for production 
from wells located on Indian lands. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-116 and 119. 
The Navajo Nation is located in the southernmost part of San Juan County. 
http://www.southeastutah.org/en/menu/110/. The Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund is 
funded by severance taxes from wells on Ute Indian Land located in Duchesne and Uintah 
Counties. Utah Code Ann. § 9-10-101 et seq. The wells for which ExxonMobil sought 
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severance tax refunds were located on Navajo Nation lands in San Juan County. In contrast, 
the Lisbon Field is located in the northeastern part of San Juan County and is comprised 
entirely of federal and State of Utah leases. R. 12 at % 10, 665. The Lisbon Field is not 
located on Indian lands, therefore, no portion of the severance taxes paid by Unocal is 
remitted to the Amici Funds. 
Under Utah law, severance tax payments for oil and gas produced from wells which 
are not located on Indian lands do not impact revitali2ation funds. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-5-116 and 119. This crucial distinction was not acknowledged during the ExxonMobil 
litigation. In fact, the potential impact on Revitalization Funds was never discussed until 
after ExxonMobil had already filed its appellate brief and the issue was only addressed by the 
Revitalization Funds. As a result "the issue did not benefit from the focus and refinement 
afforded issues actually litigated in the lower courts." Munson, 2007 UT 91, p. 21. 
Apparently unaware of the fact that severance taxes only impact the Revitalization Funds 
when the wells were located on Indian trust lands, this Court, in its haste to protect the 
solvency of the Revitalization Funds and "other [unnamed and unidentified] relatively small 
governmental entities," refused to apply the ExxonMobil decision to "other parties who may 
have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax 
Commission" regardless of whether or not those other parties operated on Indian trust lands. 
ExxonMobil, f 24. 
The Court's concern for the solvency of the Revitalization Funds also suggests that it 
may not have been aware that the Revitalization Funds would not have been affected by any 
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refund requests for periods prior to June 30, 1996. The statutory provision requiring 
deposits of severance taxes into the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund did not go into effect 
until July 1, 1997.3 Thus, for 4 and xh years of the six year period represented by 
ExxonMobil's refund request, the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund had not received any 
of ExxonMobil's severance tax overpayments.4 
Clearly the decision to deprive Unocal and other severance taxpayers whose wells 
were not on Indian lands of the right to rely on ExxonMobil'to ensure that their assessments 
were based on the value of oil and gas "in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and 
gas remaining in a relatively natural state," is error. This Court should conclude, as it did in 
Munson that "it is appropriate to overrule" the selective prospectivity limitation in the 
ExxonMobil decision. Munson, 2007 UT 91, U 21. 
2. There are no "other relatively small governmental entities" which 
would have been impacted by retroactive application of 
ExxonMobil. 
The ExxonMobil'Court's application of the prospective effect doctrine was also based 
on its concern for the solvency of "other relatively small government entities" which would, 
3
 The statute requiring deposits into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund went into 
effect July 1, 1996. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-116. 
4
 Evidence produced by the Division in another severance tax appeal further revealed 
that the Court's concern for the impact on the Revitalization Funds was misplaced inasmuch 
as the refunds to ExxonMobil were issued from the State's General Fund and the Navajo 
Nation Revitalization Fund was not impacted. Division's Supplemental Answers to 
Petitioners' First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests 
for Admissions, River Gas Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm\ Case No. 060700437 (2nd Dist. Ct , 
Dec. 7, 2006), Admissions Nos. 1, 2, 9-12, pp. 8, 10. A copy of these Answers is attached in 
the Addendum as pp. 0053-0064. 
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presumably, be burdened by the ExxonMobil decision. This concern was misplaced because, 
by law, all severance taxes, except for a portion of those collected for oil and gas production 
on Indian lands, is remitted to the state's General Fund. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-115. The 
"General Fund" is defined as "monies received into the treasury and not specially 
appropriated to any other fund." Utah Code Ann. § 67-4-2 (2007). Thus there were no 
"other relatively small governmental entities" which would have been direcdy impacted by 
the retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision. 
The ExxonMobil'Court did not have the benefit of a record on the prospective effect 
limitation requested by the Amici Funds. Consequently, the Court invoked the prospective 
effect doctrine in a manner which has resulted in significant injustice for other severance 
taxpayers, particularly those who, like Unocal, paid their severance taxes based on the correct 
interpretation of the statute and have been assessed deficiencies. 
3. The revenue concerns cited by the ExxonMobil Court are not 
implicated by deficiency proceedings. 
The ExxonmobilCourt's determination that only prospective relief would be granted 
was based on its acceptance of the Commission's representations that broad-scale refunds 
would jeopardize the solvency of the amici revitalization funds. ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53 at 
f 23.5 However, the Court's decision to foreclose taxpayers with deficiency assessments 
from relying on ExxonMobil, results in an unfair windfall for the government and, when the 
wells are on Indian trust lands, the revitalization funds. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. 
5
 This representation appears to have been unfounded in light of the fact that the 
refund issued to ExxonMobil was issued directly from the State General Fund and there was 
no effort by the State to obtain reimbursement from the Navajo Nation Revitalization Fund. 
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Department of Revenue, 161 Ariz. 135, 138-39, 776 R2d 1061, 1064-65 (1989) ("An honorable 
government would not keep taxes to which it is not entitled."). 
Deficiency assessments do not implicate the same considerations as refund requests 
inasmuch as the revenue concerns cited by the ExxonMobil Court have no application when 
the taxpayer is challenging a deficiency. If Unocal prevails in its appeals, government entities 
would not be disgorging any revenue. However, the result of the Commission's 
interpretation of ExxonMobil is that the government receives a $2.2 million windfall at 
taxpayer expense. 
By making the prospective effect doctrine applicable to deficiency assessments, the 
Court ensures that taxpayers who, like Unocal, paid their severance taxes using the correct 
interpretation of law, will be forced to pay millions of dollars in deficiency assessments.6 The 
Commission suggests that the Court intended this result in the name of equality, however, 
the quest for "equality" is not a justifiable excuse for assessing deficiencies against taxpayers 
who have paid their taxes in accordance with the correct interpretation of the applicable 
statute. The facts of this case demonstrate that the ExxonMobil Court's decision to bar relief 
in deficiency proceedings based on fiscal concerns implicated by refund actions for wells 
located on Indian lands should not be given any precedential effect. 
6
 In a recent Tax Court decision addressing the prospective application of the 
ExxonMobil decision, the Court stated: "It is worth noting that upon questioning from the 
Court neither attorney could cite to one tax case, other than ExxonMobil, that prospectively 
applied its holding to deficiency proceedings." Ruling and Order on Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel, River Gas Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm\ Case No. 060700437 (2nd Dist Ct. 
Oc t 19,2006). R. 1106. 
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This Case Demonstrates That the ExxonMobil Courts Desire to 
Prevent Administrative Hardship Caused by Application of a New Rule 
of Law Was Misplaced. 
This Court has long recognized that, in matters of statutory interpretation, "the ruling 
of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and 
prospectively." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 675 (Utah 1984). The Court has recognized an 
exception to this rule "where the 'overruled law has been justifiably relied upon or where 
retroactive operation creates a burden.'" Id, quoting Loyal Order of Moose v. County Board of 
Equalisation, 657 P.2d 257, 265 (Utah 1982).7 However, the severance tax provisions at issue 
in ExxonMobil were not "overruled." The ExxonMobil cast marks the first time that the Utah 
Supreme Court has refused to give retroactive effect to its interpretation of a statute when 
the Court's decision did not overrule either a statute or its own prior interpretation of that 
statute. The Court's conclusion that retroactive application of ExxonMobil would result in 
administrative hardship is likewise wrong. 
7
 This Court has clearly stated that prospective-only application of a decision is only 
appropriate "[w]hen we conclude that there has been justifiable reliance on the prior state 
of the law." Kennecott Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah 1993) (emphasis 
added). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court long ago established that a court should 
not consider prospective-only application of a decision unless there is "a clearly declared 
judicial doctrine [or statutory scheme] upon which [a party] relied and under which its 
conduct was lawful, a doctrine which was overruled in favor of a new rule. . . ." Hanover 
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968) (emphasis added). 
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1. The ExxonMobil decision did not announce a new rule of law. 
Prior to ExxonMobil, this Court has limited or foreclosed the retroactive operation of 
its decision when the statutes at issue were deemed unconstitutional Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
"Property Tax Dip. of the Utah State Tax Comm\ 979 P.2d 346 (Utah 1999) (Court refused to 
give retroactive effect to its finding that a rule apportioning property taxes based on aircraft 
flight paths was unconstitutional); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 
1996) (Court found statute violated constitution and only gave litigant retroactive relief); 
Kennecott Corp. v. Tax Comm% 862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah 1993) (Court upheld limitation in 
Rio Algom in finding concerning unconstitutionality of statute); Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan 
County, et a/., 681 P.2d 184 (1984) (Court gave only limited retroactive effect to determination 
that taxing provision which rolled back assessment values to a prior year was 
unconstitutional). 
The only time this Court has refused to give retroactive effect to its interpretation of a 
statute was when the Court specifically overruled its own previous interpretation of a 
statutory provision which had been relied upon for many years. Loyal Order of Moose, 657 
P.2d at 265 (Court reexamined and narrowed charitable exemption to give effect to strict 
construction of statute.). The Court refused to give retroactive effect to its reinterpretation 
of the statute because "[wjithout warning it would be inequitable to correct an interpretation 
of law that has been relied upon for so many years." Id. 
The ExxonMobil Coutt suggested that prospective application of its decision was 
necessary to "avoid administrative and financial hardship caused by retroactive application of 
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rules contrary to those relied on by the taxing authorities." ExxonMobil, f 23. This 
declaration suggests that the ExxonMobilCourt announced a new rule of law when, in fact, 
the ExxonMobil decision did not alter the law, but merely interpreted it. This Court applied 
well-established principles of statutory interpretation to determine the correct interpretation 
of the statutory provisions at issue. Accordingly, it did not create a new law with which 
taxing authorities would have to comply, but simply provided the correct interpretation of 
the existing law. 
The Court's suggestion that the ExxonMobil decision created new law is also belied by 
the fact that the only judicial interpretations of Utah's severance tax provisions, prior to the 
ExxonMobil decision, supported ExxonMobil's position. Tax Commission Appeal No. 88-
1676, p. 4 (Commission held that "the clear and literal meaning of. . . 'at the well' means the 
gross value of those products at the point of their removal from the well") (see Addendum 
pp. 0065-0070); and Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. State Tax Comm\ 845 P.2d 266, 276 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1993) (In 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the term "at the well" indicated 
that "the legislature opted not to tax the [producer's] gross receipts."). Despite these 
proclamations, the Division rejected refund requests and issued deficiency assessments based 
on its erroneous belief that the severance tax laws required valuation at the point of sale. 
If this Court upholds ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation, then, when a court 
engages in statutory interpretation, an agency which has persistently misinterpreted a statute 
can successfully request prospective relief on the basis that the agency has "justifiably relied" 
on its own erroneous interpretation of the statute. As a result, the limitations established in 
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Malan would no longer apply because an agency's persistent misinterpretation of a statute will 
now be sufficient to establish a rule of law even if the interpretation is not supported by the 
language of the statute. Because this Court's interpretation of severance tax laws in 
ExxonMobil did not establish a "new rule of law," the Court should have applied "[t]he 
general rule from time immemorial. . . that the ruling of a court is deemed to state the true 
nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively." Malan, 693 P.2d 661. 
2. The retroactive application of ExxonMobil would not have 
created an administrative hardship. 
The ExxonMobil Court imposed a prospective relief limitation because it concluded 
that retroactive application of ExxonMobil would have resulted in "administrative and 
financial hardship." ExxonMobil, f^ 23. Ironically, the "administrative hardship" is the direct 
result of the Commission's continued refusal to correctly interpret the severance tax 
provisions. The suggestion that the retroactive application of the correct statutory 
interpretation (as opposed to a change in law) results in an administrative hardship because 
taxing entities may have to issue refunds is unprecedented. 
In Loyal Order of Moose, this Court postponed the effective date of its decision 
overruling a prior interpretation of a statute to avoid the very outcome which the ExxonMobil 
decision guaranteed - deficiency assessments which would financially burden potential 
taxpayers: 
Also, if the rule were to be given retroactive effect, the assessment of back 
taxes on properties affected by this rule might well result in an unreasonable 
burden upon all those organizations and governmental bodies associated with 
it. By staying the effective date of our ruling in this case, not only are court 
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and agency resources saved, but time also is allowed for organizations affected 
to make needed adjustments. 
Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265.8 
Prior to ExxonMobil, Unocal and other taxpayers had paid their severance taxes under 
the correct interpretation of the severance tax laws. Notwithstanding prior contrary 
administrative and judicial decisions interpreting "at the well," the Division continued to 
deny refund requests and issue deficiency assessments based on its misinterpretation of 
severance tax laws. The position taken by the Division and the Commission direcdy resulted 
in an accumulation of severance tax appeals over a number of years. The hardship, if it 
existed, was a direct result of the agency's persistent refusal to accept what was ultimately 
determined to be the correct interpretation of the severance tax provisions. 
Because severance taxes had been paid based on conflicting interpretations of the 
severance tax laws, whatever interpretation the Court adopted would have necessarily 
resulted in some administrative activities. Nevertheless, the ExxonMobil Court concluded 
that the only way to avoid administrative hardship was to deprive severance taxpayers of the 
application of the ExxonMobil decision—thus insuring that the state general fund would 
receive an unexpected windfall from those parties who, like Unocal, had paid severance taxes 
under the correct interpretation of the severance tax statutes. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal 
8
 The "organizations and governmental bodies" referred to were not the assessing 
entities, but those organizations which had relied on the expansive application of the 
charitable exemption. Under the more narrow interpretation of the charitable exemption, 
those organizations would have potentially been subject to taxation. 
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MiningCo. v. Department of Revenue, 161 Ariz. 135, 138-39, 776 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1989) ("An 
honorable government would not keep taxes to which it is not entitled."). 
In addition to enforcing deficiency assessments which were pending during the 
ExxonMobil decision, the Commission has interpreted the Court's prospective relief 
limitation to authorize additional severance tax deficiency assessments against Unocal and 
other taxpayers which paid their severance taxes based on the correct interpretation of the 
severance tax provisions prior to the ExxonMobildecision. This result was prohibited by this 
Court in RioAlgom when it postponed the effective date of its decision in order to prevent 
"the assessment of back taxes on properties affected by this rule." Loyal Order of Moose, 657 
P.2d at 265. The position taken by the Division with respect to the newer deficiency 
assessments demonstrates the error in the Court's conclusion that administrative hardship 
would have resulted from retroactive application of its decision inasmuch as the Division is 
willing to undergo administrative activity to obtain additional revenue under an interpretation 
of the severance tax laws which was rejected by the ExxonMobil Court. Inasmuch as the 
Division is not deterred by "administrative hardship" associated with deficiency assessments, 
it is disingenuous to suggest that refund requests would result in "administrative hardship." 
The Court's conclusion that "administrative hardship" forecloses the right to a refund 
effectively repeals the taxpayer's statutory right to a refund of illegally collected taxes. The 
refund of taxes illegally collected is a statutory obligation: 
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for public revenue 
which is deemed unlawful by the party whose property is taxed, or from whom 
the tax or license is demanded or enforced, that party may pay under protest 
the tax or license, or any part deemed unlawful, to the officers designated and 
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authorized by law to collect the tax or license; and then the party so paying or 
a legal representative may bring an action in the tax division of the appropriate 
district court against the officer to whom the tax or license was paid, or against 
the state, county, municipality, or other taxing entity on whose behalf it was 
collected, to recover the tax or license or any portion of the tax or license paid 
under protest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301. The ExxonMobil Court's conclusion that the fulfillment of this 
statutory responsibility is an "administrative hardship" effectively repeals this statute for all 
taxpayers seeking a refund. Certainly the issuance of a refund has a financial impact on the 
entities which receive taxes. However, statutes of limitations are the means utilized by the 
legislature to protect governmental solvency. Thus, when the taxing provisions are 
misapplied or misinterpreted, a taxpayer has the legal right, under the laws of this state, to 
request a refund or to challenge a deficiency so long as the action is initiated in a timely 
manner. Tucson Eke. PomrCo. v. Apache Co., 185 Ariz. 5, 20, 912 P.2d 9, 24 (Ariz. App. 1995) 
("[W]e find it difficult to conceive how requiring the state and the affected counties to refund 
the proceeds of an illegal tax to those who paid it under protest could be viewed as 
'substantially inequitable/"). 
The Court's decision to limit the application of ExxonMobil is dangerous precedent 
which invites abuse of taxing powers. The ExxonMobil prospective relief proclamation 
permits the Commission and other taxing entities to apply taxing provisions in a manner 
which allows them to collect taxes to which they are not legally entitled. They may persist in 
their denial of refund requests and continue to seek deficiencies under their statutory 
misinterpretations until this Court ultimately provides the correct interpretation of the 
statute. Once a judicial interpretation of that statute is rendered, the taxing entities could 
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request a prospective relief limitation simply by alleging "administrative and financial 
hardship." The longer the taxing entities have persisted in their misapplication of the statute, 
the greater their alleged financial interest will be. The practical result of the ExxonMobil 
Court's refusal to give retroactive effect to its interpretation of a tax statute is to give taxing 
entities virtual immunity from refund actions and deficiency proceedings. Under 
ExxonMobil, the only taxpayer which would receive retroactive relief when a tax statute is 
finally given the correct interpretation would be the one which wins the race to the 
courthouse. As a result, all other taxpayers, otherwise entided to relief under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-301 (refund actions) and § 59-1-501 (deficiency proceedings), would be denied 
refunds or forced to pay an illegal deficiency despite statutory mechanisms designed to 
prevent this injustice.9 
If the Commission adopts the Division's argument that the prospective relief 
language insures the Division's victory in this case, Unocal will be forced to pay more than 
two million dollars in severance taxes pursuant to an interpretation of the severance tax act 
which was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Surely the ExxonMobil Court neither 
foresaw nor intended this result. 
9
 Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, a severance taxpayer which believes it has 
overpaid severance taxes has the legal right to "request]] an adjudicative proceeding and the 
correction of the assessed tax." As a result of ExxonMobil's prospective relief proclamation, 
the Commission is stripped of the ability to "correct" a tax assessment which does not 
comply with statutory provisions. 
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II. T H E COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED T H E EXXONMOBIL 
COURT'S PLAIN LANGUAGE REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE 
PROSPECTIVE RELIEF LIMITATION. 
The Commission refused to give effect to the Court's express statement that the 
prospective relief limitation only applied to refund requests and deficiency assessments which 
were "pending" before the Commission. ExxonMobil, j^ 24. Consequently, it refused to 
abate the deficiency assessment for the Second Audit Period which was issued subsequent to 
the ExxonMobil decision and ordered Unocal to pay over $800,000 in additional severance 
taxes and conservation fees based on a statutory interpretation which had been rejected by 
this Court before the deficiency assessment was even issued! 
Unocal paid its severance taxes for 1998 and 1999 using the correct statutory 
valuation method as ultimately determined by the ExxonMobil Court. However, because this 
Court held that ExxonMobil could not be applied retroactively, the Division decided to issue 
a deficiency assessment against Unocal for 1998 and 1999 which imposed severance taxes in 
the manner rejected by this Court. 
Unocal argued that the deficiency assessment for the Second Audit Period should be 
abated in light of the ExxonMobil Court's statement that the prospective relief limitation only 
applied to "refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the 
Tax Commission/' ExxonMobil, ^ 24 (emphasis added). The Commission disregarded the 
word "pending" and expanded the prospective relief limitation beyond the boundaries 
established by the ExxonMobil Court. 
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The scope of a prospective relief limitation is determined by the plain language used 
by that court to limit the application of its decision. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
862 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1993). In Kennecott, this Court looked no further than the plain language 
of Rio Algom to determine the scope of the prospective relief limitation: 
Hence, the opinion's plain language dictates that it apply only to those 
litigants and only for 1981, the tax year for which the suit in Rio Algom was 
brought. Because Kennecott was not a party to that case and seeks redress for 
the 1983 years instead of 1981, it cannot partake of the relief provided the Rio 
Algom plaintiffs. 
Id, (emphasis added). In interpreting how the prospective relief limitation should be applied, 
the Court observed that it was "cognizant of the various available options for applying our 
holding in Rio Algom and specifically rejected its application to 'others who [had] litigation 
pending.'" Id. at 1350-1351. 
In ExxonMobil, the Court crafted a prospective relief limitation which would only 
apply to "refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax 
Commission." ExxonMobil, [^ 24 (emphasis added). Like the Court in Kennecott, the 
ExxonMobil'Court was "cognizant of the various available options," yet, rather than prohibit 
the application of ExxonMobil'to #//refund requests and deficiency assessments, it instead 
limited the scope of the prospective relief limitation to only those matter which were 
"pending before the Tax Commission." Under the plain language of the ExxonMobil 
decision, Unocal is entitled to the retroactive application of that decision to its appeal of the 
deficiency assessment for the Second Audit Period. 
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The Commission's refusal to enforce the plain language of the ExxonMobil decision 
also results in a violation of due process. Commissioner Dixon recognized this problem 
when she observed that a taxpayer will be deprived of a "meaningful opportunity to be 
[heard]" if the Division is permitted to issue deficiency assessments after November 25, 
2003, which are based on the statutory interpretation which was rejected by the ExxonMobil 
Court. R. 56. 
The ExxonMobil Court has already declared that the severance tax laws require 
valuation to "occur in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a 
relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, ^ 24. Notwithstanding that declaration, the 
Commission held that the Division could ignore that proclamation and issue additional 
severance tax deficiency assessments, based on its erroneous interpretation of the relevant 
statutory provisions. The taxpayer is then forced to pay a tax which this Court has declared 
does not comply with the statute and is deprived of any opportunity to conduct a meaningful 
challenge to the tax. Ostensibly, the taxpayer has a right to challenge the tax under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-5-109 and to request a "correction of the assessed tax." However, the 
Commission has refused to make the necessary correction, ruling, in effect, that despite the 
fact that the deficiency assessment does not comply with applicable law, it will be enforced 
by the Commission.10 
10
 This result illustrates the inherent problem with applying selective prospectivity to 
matters of statutory interpretation. When a statute is held unconstitutional, the application 
of selective prospectivity insures that the statute will be enforced for the time period up until 
it is declared unconstitutional. Consequently, legislative intent is enforced for that time 
period leading up to the declaration of unconstitutionality. Once the law changes, the 
taxpayers continue to receive uniform treatment. On the other hand, when a court provides 
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III. T H E COMMISSION IGNORED PLAIN STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
W H E N IT RESOLVED CERTAIN VALUATION ISSUES. 
The remaining issues before this Court concern the meaning of certain statutory 
provisions which were applied by the Commission in determining the correct value of the oil 
and gas. Those statutory provisions include: (1) the requirement that oil and gas be valued 
when it is "transported off the field," Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a); (2) the statutory 
methodology allowing the use of posted prices of "like-quality"oil and gas to determine 
value, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103(l)(b); (3) the statutory definitions of "net-back method," 
"processing costs," and "transportation costs" in relationship to the interplay of an 
uncodified statutory provision incorporating federal regulations in the absence of applicable 
administrative rules, Id. § 59-5-101(7), (11), and (17); and (4) the annual exemption for "the 
first $50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells as defined in this part. . . ." Id. 
§ 59-5-102(2)(a). Unocal contends that the Commission erred in its interpretation of each of 
these provisions. 
A. Plain Statutory Language Required Oil and Gas to Be Valued When it 
Was "Transported off the Field." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a) imposed the severance tax on the value of the oil or 
gas "produced, saved, and sold or transported from the Geld'where the substance was 
produced." (Emphasis added). The Commission found that undisputed evidence 
the correct interpretation of a statute, that interpretation should be applied as of the 
inception of the statute because the interpretation is presumed to reflect the legislature's 
intent with respect to that statute. By refusing to make the interpretation of a statute 
retroactive, the court insures that the taxpayers are not treated uniformly under the statute 
because an arbitrary line is drawn and the law (which does not change) is simply enforced in 
an inconsistent manner. 
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established that the Lisbon Plant is not located within the legal parameters of the Lisbon 
Unit (also referred to as the "Lisbon Field"). R. 18, ^ j 40. Therefore, all oil and gas which 
was processed at the Lisbon Plant had been "transported from the field" prior to arriving at 
the plant. The Commission also found that the Division "admitted that if the Lisbon Plant 
was not located on the Lisbon Unit, 'the proper point of valuation would be before [the oil 
and gas] went into the plant.'" R. 40. 
The Division's only defense of its failure to comply with the statute was its claim 
that its ptt-ExxonMobil practice was to value oil and gas "where the production stream is 
separated for the last time, even if this occurs off the field." Id 
The Commission sustained the deficiency assessments because it believed it was 
required to "apply the Division's pit-ExxonMobil interpretation of the severance tax 
statutes": 
The Commission finds that the Division's erroneous assumption concerning 
the location of the Lisbon Plant in relation to the Lisbon Unit does not 
invalidate its assessments, because it has not been shown that this fact 
would have affected the assessments under the Division'spre-
ExxonMobil practices. 
R. 53 (emphasis added). 
If, by its reference to ptt-ExxonMobilpractices, the Commission is suggesting that the 
ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation requires valuation at the point of sale, then the 
Commission ignores the fact that the severance tax provisions do not require a sale to occur 
in order for severance tax liability to arise. § 59-5-102(l)(a) (severance tax imposed for "oil 
or gas produced, saved, and sold or transported from the Held'); § 59-5-102(l)(e) (oil or 
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gas subject to severance tax when it "is shipped outside the state"); § 59-5-102(1)(f) (oil or 
gas subject to severance tax if it "is stockpiled more than two years."). 
Surely the Court's ruling that ExxonMobilwould not have retroactive application does 
not mean that the Commission can disregard specific statutory requirements in order to 
ensure that oil or gas is valued at the point of sale. The ExxonMobil prospective relief 
limitation only applies to valuation practices specifically addressed in ExxonMobil and does 
not mean that the oil and gas must be valued at the point of sale, prior to ExxonMobil^ even 
when there are specific statutory provisions that impose severance tax before a sale occurs. 
There is no dispute regarding the correct application of the statute to the facts of this 
case. The Lisbon Plant is located off of the Lisbon Field and all of the oil and gas had been 
transported "from the field" before it arrived at the Lisbon Plant. Therefore, as Ms. Goss 
admitted in her earlier testimony, "cthe proper point of valuation would be before [the oil 
and gas] went into the plant'" R. 40. Because the ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation 
does not allow the Commission to disregard statutory provisions which were not addressed 
by the ExxonMobil Court, the Commission's rejection of Unocal's appeal on this issue should 
be reversed. 
B. The Commission Ignored Plain Statutory Language When it Allowed 
the Use of Posted Prices for "Sweet" Oil to Be Used to Establish the 
Value of Unocal's "Sour" Oil. 
The Division valued Unocal's oil for the Second Audit Period using posted prices for 
"sweet" oil even though the oil extracted from the Mississippian Pool in the Lisbon Unit was 
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"sour."11 The Commission specifically found that "the sour oil produced from the 
Mississippian Pool was not of like quality to the sweet oil produced by the Giant's Paradox 
Basin." R. 27 at \ 90 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Commission sustained the 
Division's use of posted prices for "sweet" oil to value Unocal's "sour" oil because the 
Division's prt-ExxonMobil practice was to value oil "at the point of eventual sale." R. 41. 
The Commission's decision to uphold the assessment because the method used by the 
Division was consistent with its pte-ExxonMobil practices was error because the deficiency 
assessments for the Second Audit Period were not "pending" when the ExxonMobil decision 
was issued. See Section II., supra. Because the prospective relief limitation does not apply to 
the Second Audit Period, the oil which was produced during that period should have been 
valued in accordance with plain statutory requirements. 
The statutory provision which allows the use of posted prices to determine value 
specifically requires that those posted prices be for "like-quality oil or gas at the well": 
(b) the value at the well [may be] determined by consideration of information 
relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the well in the same field or 
nearby fields or areas such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-length 
spot sales, or other reliable public sources of price or market information. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103(l)(b) (emphasis added). The ExxonMobil Court held that "<[a]t 
the well'. . .contemplates valuation in the immediate vicinity of the point of removal from 
the earth." The Commission found that "the sour oil produced from the Mississippian Pool 
11
 There was no dispute in the proceedings below regarding the Division's decision to 
use the posted price methodology to value the oil produced during the second audit period 
instead of another valuation method. The dispute with regard to the methodology focused 
only on the Division's decision to use posted prices for "sweet" oil when the oil extracted 
from the Lisbon Field was "sour" oil. 
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was not of like quality to the sweet oil produced by the Giant's Paradox Basin until the sour 
oil had been processed at the Lisbon Plant" R. 27 at j^ 90. Because the ExxonMobil 
prospective relief limitation does not apply, the Commission erred when it ignored the 
guidance found in ExxonMobil and upheld the Division's use of posted prices for "sweet" oil 
to value "sour" oil. 
C. The Commission Erred When it Held That Federal Regulations 
Supersede Statutory Definitions of Allowable Deductions under the 
Net-back Method. 
The Commission approved Unocal's use of the net-back method for determination of 
the value of NGLs for the two audit periods.12 Utah law defines the net-back method to 
require that the "costs of transportation, not to exceed 50% of the value of the oil or gas, and 
12
 The Commission approved this practice because the Division had used the net-
back method to value NGLs prior to ExxonMobil However, until this case, the Commission 
had rejected the notion that federal regulations governed the net-back calculation. R. 45, n. 
56. Thus, this case represents the first time the Commission has upheld the application of 
the federal regulations to the calculation of value under the net-back method. Id. The 
Commission's approval of this change in practice, and its decision to allow this new 
interpretation of the law in the Second Deficiency Assessment, despite its conflict with "pre-
ExxonMobil practices," is hypocritical, at best. The Commission rejected several of Unocal's 
claims that the Division's practices did not comply with statutory requirements on the sole 
basis that those practices were consistent with the Division's "pte-ExxonMobilinterpretation 
of the severance tax statutes." R. 40 ("The Commission . . . is not convinced that the 
location of the processing plant is critical to its pit-ExxonMobilinterpretation of the 
severance tax statutes"); R. 41 (Commission approved Division's use of posted prices of 
sweet gas to value sour gas finding "that the Division's assessments are correct, given its pre-
ExxonMobil practices."); R. 47 ("Under the Commission's pit-ExxonMobil interpretation of 
the severance tax statutes, the Commission rejects Unocal's proposed use of the net-back 
method to value the oil and residue gas it produced during all tax years at issue."). The 
Commission's decision to sustain the Division's departure from approved "pit-ExxonMobil 
practices" and overrule its own conclusion "that the federal regulations did not govern the 
net-back calculations" cannot be reconciled with the Commission's position with regard to 
the prospective relief limitation. 
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processing shall be deducted from the proceeds received for the oil or gas and any extracted 
or processed product . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(7). The statutory definition of 
"transportation costs" is "the reasonable actual costs of transporting oil or gas products from 
the well to the point of sale . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(17) (emphasis added). 
"Processing costs" are defined by statute as "the reasonable actual costs of processing gas." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(11). 
The applicable statutes must be interpreted according to their plain language. 
ExxonMobil, % 14, citing In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). However, if there is 
any ambiguity, then Utah law requires that taxation statutes be construed '"liberally in favor 
of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such 
intent exists.'" ExxonMobil, Tf 19, quoting County Bd. of Equalisation of Wasatch County, 944 P.2d 
at 373-74. 
The Commission refused to apply statutorily defined deductions because it held that it 
is "bound by the federal regulations" unless they "are silent as to an issue," and only then 
"may [it] employ the guidance found in the Section 59-5-101 net-back definitions." R. 45. 
This conclusion is wrong because federal regulations do not supercede Utah's statutory law, 
particularly when those restrictions conflict with the plain language of the statutory 
definitions of "processing costs" and "transportation costs." 
1. Federal regulations cannot circumvent plain statutory language. 
The fact that the reference to federal regulations is made by statute does not elevate 
those federal regulations to the level of statutory law. The provision relied on by the 
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Commission provided that the "applicable federal regulations remain in effect until the 
commission makes the rules authorized by this chapter "13 Thus, if and when the 
Commission adopted administrative rules, those rules would have immediately superseded 
the federal regulations 
The authorization for the administrative rules is found at Utah Code Ann § 59-5-
101(11) and (17) which both direct the Commission to "adopt rules to implement this 
definition " "Implement" means "to give practical effect to " Webster's New World 
Dictionary, 2nd ed , p 705 Thus, the directive to adopt administrative rules was not an 
invitation to redefine "processing costs" and "transportation costs" which were already 
defined by statute, but to give effect to the existing definitions In Sanders Brine Shrimp v 
Audit Dw Utah State Tax Comm'n, this Court rejected the Commission's attempt to restrict an 
exemption by redefining a statutory term, finding "no obvious source for the Commission's 
narrowing of the exemption's availability" and concluding that the Commission's rule was 
"out of harmony with a governing statute " 846 P 2d 1304, 1306 (The statute "does not 
authorize the Commission to define the term 'manufacturer/ nor does it authorize the 
Commission to otherwise limit the availability of the exemption as it has done in [the rule] ") 
If the Commission had adopted administrative rules which redefined or narrowed the 
statutory definitions of "processing costs" or "transportation costs," those administrative 
13
 The statutory provision (Section 4 of House Bill 63) was never codified and is 
found in the annotations to Utah Code Ann § 59-5-101 That annotation, in its entirety, 
states 
Laws 1990, ch 247, § 4 provides The applicable federal regulations remain in 
effect until the commission makes the rules authorized by this chapter ' 
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rules would have been invalid. Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993). A federal regulation—which is subordinate to an administrative rule-
should not be given greater force than the administrative rule would be given, particularly 
where that federal regulation cannot be harmonized with the governing statute. 
Notwithstanding this well-established legal principle, the Commission held that it was 
"bound by the federal regulations" and would only "employ the guidance found in the 
Section 59-5-101 net-back definitions" "if the federal regulations are silent as to an issue." 
R.45. 
2. The federal regulations relied on by the Commission conflict 
with the plain language of the statutory definition of 
"transportation costs." 
Section 59-5-101(17) specifically defines "transportation costs" to include "the 
reasonable actual costs of transporting oil or gas products from the well to the point of sale 
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(17) (emphasis added). The Commission found that Unocal 
had calculated the transportation costs which it deducted from the value of its NGLs "using 
the guidance found in the Section 59-5-101 net-back definitions," but refused to accept those 
calculations because they did not follow federal regulations. R. 45. However, the federal 
regulations conflict with the statutory definition of transportation costs. 
The federal regulations with which the Commission believes Unocal should have 
complied specifically exclude the costs associated with transporting oil or gas "from the well" 
by excluding gathering costs from the definition of "transportation allowance." 30 CFR 
§ 295.101 (oil) and 30 CFR § 206.151 (gas). Gathering costs are defined as "the movement 
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of lease production to a central accumulation and/or treatment point" on or off the lease. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Because the statute defines transportation costs to include "reasonable actual costs of 
transporting oil or gas products from the well" it differs from the federal limitations 
inasmuch as it permits a deduction for gathering costs. The Commission ignored this crucial 
distinction in its Order, and applied the federal regulations without regard to the plain 
language of the statutory definition of "transportation costs."14 The Commission's 
application of federal regulations despite the fact that Unocal's calculations complied with 
the statute's plain language is reversible error. 
3. The federal regulations relied on by the Commission conflict 
with the plain language of the statutory definition of "processing 
costs." 
"Processing costs" are defined by statute as "the reasonable actual costs of processing 
gas." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(11). There is no statutory limitation on the amount of 
processing costs which can be deducted under the net-back method. Id. Nevertheless, the 
Commission held that the statutory provision was restricted by the federal regulation which 
limited the processing allowance for NGLs to 66 2 / 3 % unless there was MMS approval for a 
higher allowance. R. 45, citing Section 30 CFR § 206.158(c)(2). Unocal had obtained such 
approval for tax years 1996 through 1999. Consequently, the Commission approved a 
14
 The language "from the well" should not be disregarded even if this Court 
concludes that the prospective effect limitation of ExxonMobil applies because the 
Commission specifically agreed that the net-back method is the correct method to use in 
valuing Unocal's NGLs and the net-back method, by definition, subtracts value added after 
extraction of the oil or gas from the well. 
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processing cost allowance for those years of 99%. However, it sustained the Division's 66 
2 / 3 % limitation on processing costs for 1994 and 1995. This was error inasmuch as the 
statutory definition of "processing costs" does not contain any limitation on the amount of 
processing costs which can be deducted, nor does that provision authorize the adoption of 
federal regulations which restrict the deduction. Sanders Brine Shrimp, 846 P.2d at 1306. The 
plain language of the statute controls over any federal regulations which are incorporated in 
the absence of the Commission's adoption of administrative rules. 
The Commission found that Unocal had "calculated [processing and transportation] 
costs using the guidance found in the Section 59-5-101 net-back definitions only, without 
consideration of any limitations found in the federal regulations." R. 45. Inasmuch as the 
statute permits deduction of "reasonable actual costs" without limitation, the restrictions 
contained in federal regulations conflict with the statutory definition of processing costs and 
should not have been applied by the Commission. Sanders Brine Shrimp, 846 P.2d at 1306. 
The Commission erred when it disregarded plain statutory language. 
D. The Commission Disregarded Plain Statutory Language in its 
Calculation of the Annual Exemption. 
Section 59-5-102(2)(a) exempts "the first $50,000 annually in gross value of each well 
or wells" from severance tax. It also provides that the exemption is "to be prorated among 
the owners in proportion to their respective interests." Even though Utah law requires that 
exemptions are read narrowly, the statute providing the exemption must still be interpreted 
in accordance with the statute's plain language. Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Dip. Of 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997). 
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In its audits, the Division only gave Unocal a single exemption for all wells located 
within the entire Lisbon Field for each year through 1998. Furthermore, for 1999, the 
Division reduced the exemption by 50% because Unocal sold its interest in the Lisbon Unit 
half-way through the year. Unocal challenged the Division's application of the annual 
exemption because it believes the statute requires that it should have received an exemption 
for each well, and that it should have received the full exemption for 1999 because the plain 
language of the statute requires the exemption to be applied to "the first $50,000" of 
production. The Commission rejected both arguments holding that the well exemption is a 
"field exemption" and that the exemption does not apply to "the first $50,000" of 
production, but to the annual production. The Commission's decision conflicts with plain 
statutory language. 
1. "Field Exemption" vs. "Well Exemption." 
Section 59-5-101(20) defines "well" as "any extractive means from which oil or gas is 
produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one person." The 
Commission's conclusion that "the operation of a number of wells to extract oil and gas 
would appear to be a single means of extraction" ignores this Court's interpretation of that 
same definition in ExxonMobil13 The ExxonMobil Court concluded that "extractive means" 
"seems to indicate physical extraction from the earth, not the extraction of oil or gas from 
other impurities further down the line as the Tax Commission suggests." ExxonMobil, H 16. 
15
 The well exemption was not at issue in ExxonMobil Therefore, the prospective 
relief limitation did not require that the Commission to apply the pne-ExxonMobil 
interpretation of the exemption. Indeed, the Commission did not suggest that the 
prospective relief limitation controlled the outcome on this issue. 
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Thus a "well," as defined by Utah law, was "the point at which the oil or gas is physically 
removed from the earth." Id., If 19. 
The Commission's decision that this was a field exemption also ignores the fact that a 
"well" is defined as being "located within an oil or gas field" while a "field" could not be 
"located within" a field. 
The Commission also based its decision on the fact that the exemption applies to 
"each well or wells" rather than simply to "each well." The addition of the word "wells" may 
simply be an indication that an oil or gas producer operating more than one well would 
receive more than one exemption. The significance which the Commission attaches to the 
word "wells" ignores the fact that the same word is used in other exemption provisions 
within the same statute and, in each case, there is no question that each or all of the wells 
may qualify for the full exemption. See § 59-5-102(2)(b) (exemption for "stripper wells"); 
§ 59-5-102(2)(c) (exemption for "first six months of production for wells started after 
January 1, 1984, but before January 1, 1990"); § 59-5-102(2)(d) (exemption for "the first six 
months of production for wildcat wells started after January 1,1990"); § 59-5-102(2)(e) 
(exemption for "the first six months of production for development wells started after 
January 1, 1990). The tax credit of up to $30,000 for recompletion or workover is likewise 
available for each well. § 59-5-102(3)(b). 
The Commission's characterization of the "well exemption" as a "field exemption" is 
not consistent with the plain statutory language and effectively inserts a significant limitation 
into the exemption which simply does not exist as the statute has been written. The fact that 
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an exemption should be narrowly construed is no excuse for ignoring the exemption's plain 
language. 
2. Proration of exemption for 1999. 
The Division reduced the annual exemption available to Unocal in 1999 by 50% as a 
result of the mid-year sale of Unocal. The Commission upheld the Division's actions 
because "Section 59-5-102(2) (a) specifically provides that the $50,0000 exemption shall be 
'prorated among the owners in proportion to their respective interests in the production or 
in the proceeds of the production.'" R. 50. The Commission concluded that this section 
"mandate [d] the Division to prorate the annual exemption when determining Unocal's tax 
liability for a year in which it did not share in the proceeds and production for the entire 
year." Id 
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission completely ignored the plain language of 
the exemption. The law specifically exempts "the Grst $50,000annually in gross value of 
each well or wells." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(2)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, only when 
the value of production from a well exceeds $50,000, does the oil and gas produced from 
that well become subject to severance tax. The language relied on by the Commission does 
not alter this exemption. It simply requires the Division to prorate the exemption among the 
parties who share ownership when "the first $50,000" of oil or gas is extracted from the 
wells.16 
16
 In the proceedings before the Commission, the Division defended its reduction of 
the annual exemption by relying on Rule 865-150.1.D. which requires "those who are 
required to report and pay the tax on a quarterly basis" to take no more than "one-fourth of 
the annual exemption" each quarter. Utah Admin. Rules R.865-150.1.D. Because the 
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CONCLUSION 
Unocal respectfully requests this Court to overrule ExxonMobil's prospective relief 
limitation and remand this matter to the Commission to determine value in accordance with 
this Court's guidance in ExxonMobil This Court should also reverse the Commission's 
determination that (1) federal regulations redefine or restrict the statutory definitions of 
processing costs and transportation costs, (2) the well exemption is a field exemption, and 
(3) the well exemption can be provided in contravention of the statute's plain language 
In the alternative, Unocal respectfully requests this Court to reverse the Commission's 
findings which were based on an overly broad or erroneous misinterpretation of the scope of 
the ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation and vacate the assessments for the Second Audit 
Period insomuch as they were not "pending" during ExxonMobil, and are based on an 
interpretation of severance tax laws which was rejected by this Court With respect to the 
First Audit Period, this Court should vacate the deficiency assessment inasmuch as it does 
not comply with the statutory requirement that the oil and gas be valued when it is 
"transported from the field " 
statute specifically applies the exemption to "the first $50,000" of production, this rule is 
invalid inasmuch as it violates the "long-standing principle of administrative law that an 
agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statute " Sanders Brine Shrimp, 846 P 2d 
at 1306 
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DATED this 27th day of May, 2008. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
^-ifr^rc 
David J. Crapo 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter pertains to a consolidated appeal of three separate Statutory Notices issued to 
Union Oil Company of California ("Unocal") by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission (the "Division"). On March 27, 28, and 29, 2007, the Tax Commission conducted a Formal 
Hearing for the consolidated appeals. On May 14, 2007, each of the parties submitted a post-hearing 
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. 
0 0 U U L O 
Appeal Nos. 01-0033, 04-1283 & 04-1284 
Based upon the pre-hearing briefs, testimony and evidence presented at the Formal 
Hearing, and the post-hearing proposed findings and conclusions, the Commission makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This consolidated appeal includes three appeals arising from three separate 
Statutory Notices issued by the Division: Appeal No. 01-0033, Appeal No. 04-1283, and Appeal No. 04-
1284 (hereinafter collectively, "the Appeals"). 
2. The tax at issue in Appeal Nos. 01-0033 and 04-1284 is the severance tax. At 
issue in Appeal No. 04-1283 is the conservation fee, the amount of which is tied directly to the value of 
oil and gas as established for purposes of the severance tax. 
3. Appeal No. 01-0033 involves the four-year audit period January 1, 1994 to 
December 3 1, 1997 (the "First Audit Period"). 
4. Appeal Nos. 04-1283 and 04-1284 involve the audit period January 1, 1998 to 
June 30, 1999 (the "Second Audit Period").1 The First and Second Audit Periods may be referred to 
collectively as the "Consolidated Audit Period." 
5. The audits at issue in the Appeals involve the oil, gas, and natural gas liquids 
("NGLs") produced by Unocal from the Lisbon Unit located in San Juan County, Utah. 
6. The Lisbon Unit was unitized in 1962.2 The area of exploration initially 
designated by the Unit Agreement for the Development and Exploration of the Lisbon Unit (the "Unit 
The statutory notices for the Second Audit Period included the period of January 1, 1998 through 
December 3 1, 1999. However, both parties agree that the correct audit period is January 1, 1998 through 
June 30, 1999, because Unocal sold all of its interest in the oil and gas production from the Lisbon Unit 
and the Lisbon Gas Plant effective July 1, 1999. 
2
 See Division's Exhibit 11, Unit Agreement for the Development and Operation of the Lisbon 
Unit Area, County of San Juan, State of Utah, dated April 6, 1962. 
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Agreement") initially consisted of 20,941 92 acres that were identified for potential exploration of the 
Mississippian Pool3 
7 The Unit Agreement provided that the Exhibit "B" attached thereto would set 
forth "all land in the Unit Area" and that it was subject to revision "whenever changes in the Unit Area 
render such revision necessary, or when requested by the Oil and Gas Supervisor 
8 The Unit Agreement also designated an "'Initial Mississippian Participating 
Area' representing the acreage known to be productive or essential for unit operations" as of the date of 
the agreement5 The initial participating area consisted of 5,878 76 acres of land that was described in 
Exhibit C to the Unit Agreement 6 
9 The Lisbon (Mississippian) Unit area was revised and legal descriptions setting 
forth such revisions were filed with the United States Geological Survey in July 1967 as "Revised Exhibit 
B" 7 
10 Under the Revised Exhibit B, the Lisbon Unit Area was reduced from 20,941 92 
acres to 6,038 76 acres It includes both federal and State of Utah oil and gas leases 8 
11 The Lisbon Unit is contained within Township 30 S, Range 24 E in San Juan 
County The Lisbon Unit comprises all of sections 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, and 16 It also includes portions 
of sections 2, 3, 11, 12, 22 and 24 9 The only portion of section 22 contained within the Lisbon Unit is 
the eighty acres comprising the northern half of the northwest quarter of section 22 10 
Id at Exhibit B, p 9 
Id,p 2,1(2 
Id.pl 
Id, p 7 & Exhibit C 
Id, at Revised Exhibit B 
Id 
Division's Exhibit 3 
Division's Exhibit 3, Di\ lsion's Exhibit 11 at Re\ lsed Exhibit B 
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12. The Mississippian participating area and the Lisbon Unit are identical except that 
the participating area does not include the 80-acre portions of sections 22 and 24 that are included within 
the Lisbon Unit.11 
13. Unocal was the designated Unit Operator of the Lisbon Unit at all times during 
the Consolidated Audit Period. 
14. The Lisbon Unit consists of two formations, the McCracken Formation (the 
"McCracken Pool") and the Mississippian Redwall Limestone Formation (the "Mississippian Pool"), 
from which oil and gas were extracted during the Consolidate Audit Period.12 
McCracken Pool 
15. The McCracken Pool is located directly above the Mississippian Pool. The Unit 
Agreement for the Lisbon (McCracken) Unit was submitted in 1989.13 
16. According to undisputed testimony at the Formal Hearing, the oil produced from 
the McCracken Pool during the Consolidated Audit Period was sweet oil. 
17. "Sweet oil" is oil that does not contain hydrogen sulfide (H2S) or has a very low 
level of this contaminant. "Sweet gas" is likewise defined as gas that does not contain contaminants such 
as H2S, carbon dioxide (C02) or nitrogen (N2). Sweet oil and sweet gas are more valuable than sour oil 
and sour gas because they do not require extensive processing to remove contaminants. 
18. Unocal's witnesses testified that the oil produced from the McCracken Pool was 
stored at the wellhead in tanks located directly adjacent to the wells and that some of the oil was sold at 
the wellhead. 
Division's Exhibit 11, comparison of Revised Exhibit B and Exhibit C. 
Unocal's Exhibit 2. 
Division's Exhibit 10. 
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19. The heating value of gas is measured in British Thermal Units ("BTUs"). The 
BTU value is an important characteristic for gas. A high BTU value indicates that the gas produced has a 
higher burn quality and contains less contaminants. A BTU measurement of 900 to 1200 indicates the 
gas is good in quality and contains few contaminants. Such gas may be referred to as "sweet gas." A 
BTU measurement of 600 to 750 is a low measurement and indicates the gas is poor in quality and 
contains contaminants. Such gas may be referred to as "sour gas." Gas with a low BTU value might not 
even burn. A "sweet gas" is more valuable than a "sour gas." 
20. The gas produced from the McCracken Pool during the Consolidated Audit 
Period was a sweet gas with few impurities. Unocal's witness, Mr. Russ Wimberley, testified that the gas 
produced from the McCracken Pool generally had a heating value in excess of 900 BTU per cubic foot. 
This testimony was not refuted. 
21. Another of Unocal's witnesses, Ms. Renee Crosby, testified that through July 
1997 of the First Audit Period, all of the gas produced from the McCracken Pool was transported from the 
Lisbon Field and reinjected into the nearby Big Indian Unit for storage purposes. Unocal's witnesses 
testified that Unocal had intended to recover the gas stored in Big Indian, but that they understood the gas 
had been lost in the formation and could no longer be recovered. 
22. From August 1997 until the end of the Second Audit Period, the gas from the 
McCracken Pool was transported from the Lisbon Unit to the Lisbon Plant and was processed at the plant. 
A contract concerning the gas produced from the McCracken Pool provided for a 30% processing 
allowance.15 
14
 See Unocal's Exhibit 18, Gas Purchase Contract D-l. This contract was for Unocal's sale of gas 
produced from wells located in the McCracken Unit (wells identified at Bates no. U00440). The contract 
guaranteed that the gas would be in its "natural state" (Bates no. U00448) and that its quality would range 
between 900 and 1200 BTU (Bates no. U00449); and see Unocal's Exhibit 33. 
15
 Unocal's Exhibit 21, ex. C-l. 
~
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23. At the Formal Hearing, Unocal conceded liability for severance tax and 
conservation fees for oil and gas produced from the McCracken Pool during the Consolidated Audit 
Period. This concession was based on the fact that some of the oil produced from the McCracken Pool 
was sold at the well and much of the gas was transported for storage at the Big Indian Unit. When Unocal 
calculated the value of the oil or gas in its natural state, Unocal concluded that there was some severance 
tax liability for its production of oil and gas from the McCracken Pool. 
24. Unocal calculated its liability for severance taxes and conservation fees for the 
McCracken oil and gas.16 According to Unocal's calculations, Unocal's liability for severance taxes on 
the oil and gas produced from the McCracken Pool during the Consolidated Audit Period is $110,566.43. 
Unocal also calculated that its liability for conservation fees during this same period is $7,272.49.l7 
Based on Unocal's calculations, Unocal contends that its liability for the oil and gas produced from the 
McCracken Pool for tax years 1998 and 1999, the Second Audit Period, is $62,410.79 and its liability for 
conservation fees during this same period is $4,160.71, for a total of $66,571.50. 
Mississippian Pool 
25. Prior to and during the Consolidated Audit Period, Unocal operated 
approximately 30 wells in the Lisbon Unit that produced, from the Mississippian Pool, oil and gas. 
26. Each individual well producing from the Mississippian Pool in the Lisbon Unit 
has a field separator, which separates the production into three streams: oil, gas, and water.18 
27. After initial separation, the volume of oil and gas produced by each well is 
measured by a meter located in the immediate vicinity of the wellhead. These meters were identified by 
16
 Unocal's Exhibit 17. 
Id. 
The field separators are visible on the Division's Exhibit 25, a DVD showing a field visit to the 
Lisbon Field, and were identified by Unocal's witnesses at the Formal Hearing. See also Unocal's 
Exhibit 23. 
- 6 -
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Unocal's witness during a video presentation at the Formal Hearing. Ms. Inge-Lise Goss, the Division's 
witness, also conceded that oil and gas from the Lisbon Unit was measured at the wellhead. The oil, gas, 
and water production is then recombined and transported by gathering lines to the Lisbon Plant.19 
28. There are no tanks located directly at the wells to store oil or gas produced from 
the Mississippian formation. 
29. Unocal calculated its liability for severance taxes and conservation fees for the 
Mississippian oil and gas.20 Unocal calculated and contends that its liability for severance tax and 
conservation fees associated with the oil and NGLs produced during the Consolidated Audit Period is 
$0.00. It also calculated and contends that its liability for severance taxes on the gas produced during the 
same period is $55,583.58, while its liability for conservation fees is $3,705.57, for a total of 
$59,289.15.21 All of the liability for severance tax and conservations fees on the gas related to tax years 
1998 and 1999, the Second Audit Period. 
The Lisbon Plant 
30. In 1989, Unocal and its partners determined that the oil production from the 
Mississippian Pool within the Lisbon Unit was reaching the end of its economic viability and that the gas 
produced from the Mississippian Pool should be sold. 
31. Unocal's witnesses testified that sales of oil and gas sometimes occur at the 
wellhead. 
32. Gas sold downstream from the wellhead is generally worth more than gas sold at 
the wellhead because the seller of the gas has incurred additional costs to transport it and, perhaps, to 
process it. 
19
 Unocal's Exhibit 23 and Division's Exhibit 25. 
20
 Unocal's Exhibit 17, p.3. 
Id. 
~
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33. To facilitate selling the gas produced from the Mississippian Pool, Unocal and its 
partners modified the existing Lisbon Unit gas processing facilities (the "Lisbon Plant") by constructing 
additional processing and treating facilities at the plant at a cost in excess of $89,000,000.22 
34. According to Unocal's Authority for Expenditure ("AFE") submitted on October 
17, 1989, the total investment in the Lisbon Plant was initially projected to be $33,320,000, and this 
investment was expected to generate a 25% return on investment ("ROI").23 
35. On March 6, 1992, Unocal prepared a first supplement to the AFE wherein it 
detailed some expected cost overruns resulting from "estimate errors and inflation."24 Pursuant to this 
supplement, the project was expected to cost approximately $48,920,000. 
36. On January 18, 1993, a second supplement to the AFE was prepared which 
requested additional funds for a total plant cost of $88,412,000." In the proposal for approval of the 
second supplement to the AFE, dated March 3, 1993, Unocal revised the projected after-tax ROI to be 
13.4%.26 
37. The Lisbon Plant was constructed in accordance with the second supplemental 
AFE and became operational on or about October 1, 1993. 
38. All necessary treating and processing of the oil, gas, and NGLs produced from 
the Lisbon Unit occurs at the Lisbon Plant. 
Unocal's Exhibit 37. 
Id, AFE No. 392120 dated 10/17/89. 
Id, AFE No. 392120-S1 dated 3/6/92. 
Id, AFE No. 392120-S2 dated 1/18/93. 
Id, proposal 534601 dated 3/29/93. 
•
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39. The Lisbon Plant is located in Township 30 S, Range 24 E Section 22 in San 
Juan County. Unocal's witness testified that the Lisbon Plant is located in the southeast quarter of the 
southwest quarter of Section 22.27 This testimony was unrebutted. 
40. The Lisbon Plant is not located within the legal parameters of the Lisbon Unit as 
designated by Revised Exhibit B to the Unit Agreement. It is also not located within the Lisbon 
participating area designated by Exhibit C to the Unit Agreement.28 
41. During the Consolidated Audit Period, all of the production by Unocal from the 
Mississippian Pool was transported by gathering lines from the Lisbon Unit to the Lisbon Plant. The 
greatest transport distance is approximately 6 to 8 miles, and the minimum transport distance is 
approximately 1 to 2 miles. 
42. When the oil or gas arrives at the Lisbon Plant, it is no longer on the property 
designated as the Lisbon Unit or the Lisbon participating area. 
Oil Processing at Lisbon Unit 
43. According to the undisputed testimony of Unocal's witnesses, the oil produced 
from the Mississippian Pool at the Lisbon Field is "sour" crude because it contains significant amounts of 
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) when produced at the wellhead.29 
44. At the Lisbon Plant, the hydrogen sulfide is removed from the sour crude oil 
before the oil is sold. This process is called "sweetening." 
45. At the inlet of the Lisbon Plant, the production streams are separated into oil, gas, 
and water. The oil goes to a stabilizer for treating and conditioning. Hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, 
27
 See also Unocal's Exhibit 38. 
2
 Division's Exhibit 11. 
"Sweet" oil contains less than 0.5% sulfide and does not have the corrosive characteristics of sour 
oil. It is easier to process and is more valuable than sour oil. Comptroller's Decision, 1991 WL 129469 
(Tex.Cptr.Pub.Acct.) (May 16, 1991). 
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traces of other inert gases, and volatile hydrocarbons, such as methane, are removed from the oil as part 
of the treating and conditioning at the stabilizer and are added to the gas stream for removal or recovery 
of these various components at later stages. 
46. Following stabilization, the oil goes to storage tanks that are located near the 
stabilizers, after which it is sold at the Lease Automatic Custody Transfer ("LACT"), located at the 
tailgate of the Lisbon Plant, pursuant to arm's-length contracts. 
Gas Processing at Lisbon Unit 
47. The gas produced from the Mississippian Pool at the Lisbon Field has significant 
impurities. These impurities include carbon dioxide (C02), nitrogen (N2), and hydrogen sulfide (H2S). 
48. Mr. Wimberley, a petroleum engineer witness for Unocal, examined gas 
chromatograph analyses of the Mississippian gas that identified its physical characteristics and 
contaminants.30 Mr. Wimberley testified that the chromatograph samples revealed that the contaminants 
for the Mississippian gas were significant. Carbon dioxide (C02) accounted for more than 20% of the 
produced compositions, nitrogen (N2) accounted for more than 10% of the compositions, and hydrogen 
sulfide (H2S) accounted for approximately 1% of the compositions. The desired gas product, methane, 
only accounted for 40% to 60% of the compositions. The BTU values for the gas compositions were 
below 800, with most measurements ranging between 650 and 750 before any processing took place. 
49. Mr. Wimberley testified that the gas produced from the Mississippian Pool was 
the worst quality gas he had ever seen. According to Mr. Wimberley, gas produced at a wellhead may 
sometimes have two significant impurities, but he testified that he had never seen gas as contaminated as 
the gas produced from the Mississippian Pool, which contained three impurities. 
30 
31 
Unocal's Exhibit 28, Bates nos. U00740 - U00742, and U00118 - U00120. 
Id 
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50. Mr. Wimberley testified that gas with a BTU in the 650 to 750 range might not 
even burn. 
51. When the production streams arrive at the Lisbon Plant, the gas is separated from 
the oil and water and compressed in preparation for processing. 
52. The gas then goes through a multiple-stage amine solution treatment to remove 
both carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide. These impurities are sent to the sulfur plant for further treating 
and disposal. 
53. The sulfur is removed and processed so that it can be sold. Mr. Wimberley 
testified that Unocal is required to dispose of the sulfur and that there are various alternatives available for 
disposal of sulfur, one of which is treating and selling the sulfur. Mr. Wimberley testified that the costs 
of treating the sulfur far exceed any revenue generated by the sales of the sulfur byproduct. 
54. After going through the amine unit, the gas goes through a glycol system for 
conditioning and dehydration. First, it is processed through a diglycol amine system to remove trace 
amounts of acid gases and water. The gas then goes through a tri-ethylene glycol system for further 
dehydration. The last stage of the dehydration process consists of passing the gas stream through a dry 
bed molecular sieve. 
55. The gas is then passed through a cryogenic/chiller unit before going to cold 
separation where the stream is separated into two streams, one containing a residue gas that contains 
nitrogen and helium and the other containing UY" grade raw make (NGLs). 
56. The residue gas containing nitrogen and helium goes through the nitrogen 
rejection unit ("NRU"), where nitrogen from the gas is disposed off. Helium is removed from the gas 
stream at the helium plant for further processing and sale. 
- 11 -
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57. The "Y" grade raw make refers to liquefiable hydrocarbons, or NGLs, that also 
contains an ethane component. The "Y" grade raw make stream goes to a demethanizer to remove 
methane, which is combined with the residue gas stream once the nitrogen and helium has been removed. 
58. The residue gas stream is then compressed at the Lisbon Plant and delivered to 
the Northwest Pipeline for a sale at a sales meter that is visible from the front of the Lisbon Plant. 
59. After the gas that was produced from the Mississippian Pool undergoes the 
processing steps described above, the gas typically has a BTU near 1000.32 
60. During the Consolidated Audit Period, all of the gas produced from the 
Mississippian Pool was sold as residue gas or as the UY" grade raw make (NGLs). Both were sold at the 
tailgate of the Lisbon Plant, as separate streams and pursuant to arm's-length contracts.33 
61. The NGLs sold from the Lisbon Plant typically consist of ethane, propane, 
butane, iso-butane, and natural gasoline. During the Consolidated Audit Period, the NGLs were not 
fractionalized into their separate components at the time of sale. 
Appeal No. 01-0033 
62. For the period from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1997, Unocal filed 
quarterly and annual tax returns for severance taxes on the oil and gas produced from the Mississippian 
Pool and the McCracken Pool in the Lisbon Unit.34 On its returns, Unocal determined that the value of 
the oil, gas, and NGLs it produced was equal to the revenue it received for the products at the tailgate of 
the Lisbon Plant, except for two subtractions. First, Unocal claimed a gas processing deduction for the 
NGLs based on approximately two-thirds of the total value of the NGLs produced. Second, Unocal 
Unocal's Exhibit 28, Bates nos. U00743 & U0012L 
Unocal's Exhibits 18 and 19. 
Unocal's Exhibit 3. 
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deducted some workover allowances Unocal, however, did not claim any other deductions for 
processing costs or transportation costs 
63 On August 27, 1997, Unocal filed a severance tax refund claim for the Lisbon 
field for the 1994 to 1996 period Unocal's refund claim was based on its conclusion that further 
deductions for transportation and other post-production costs were permitted under the net-back valuation 
method set forth in Utah's severance tax statute 
64 Unocal documented its claim for the refund request with its "Severance Tax 
Refund Calculations" that was prepared by Shiv Om Consultants Inc ("Shiv Om"), a copy of which was 
provided to the Division 35 Unocal's net-back method was calculated by deducting all processing costs 
from its sales contract prices In its prehearing brief, Unocal indicated that it "did not include 
transportation costs in its refund claim because the processing costs associated with the production from 
the Mississippian Pool so far exceeded the value of the combined production Transportation costs 
represented only 8% of the total post-production costs "36 
65 Mr Jason Thakker is an employee of Shiv Om and helped prepare the documents 
(Unocal's Exhibits 8 and 9) that Unocal submitted to support its initial refund claim for the 1994 through 
1996 tax years Shiv Om also produced Exhibit 34, which purports to show Unoca's total revenues and 
total "allowable" costs for purposes of the net-back method for all years at issue Mr Thakker testified 
that the allowable costs Shiv Om calculated were based on the definitions found in Utah's severance tax 
statutes, not the federal regulations used by the Minerals Management Service of the U S Department of 
the Interior ("MMS") to determine ro}alty values Mr Thakker further testified that the costs used by the 
MMS to determine ro>alty values are not the same costs used to determine values for purposes of Utah's 
Unocal's Exhibit 8 
Unocal's Prehearing Bnef fn 1 
-
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severance tax. He specifically pointed out that "field gathering costs" would be an allowable cost under 
Utah's severance tax statutes, but would not be an allowable cost under the MMS federal regulations. 
66. By letter dated February 5, 1998, the Commission required Unocal to file 
amended returns for all tax years for which it was seeking a refund of severance taxes. 
67. On July 22, 1998, pursuant to the Division's request, Unocal submitted amended 
returns to the Commission for years 1994 through 1996, in addition to an amended return for 1997, for 
which it now also sought a refund. The total amount of the refund requested by Unocal was $1,107,504.37 
68. By letter dated October 26, 1998, the Commission notified Unocal that it had 
reviewed Unocal's account and had determined that Unocal was entitled to a refund for years 1994 
through 1997 of $1,092,757.15 in tax and $124,851.90 in interest, for a total of $1,217,609.05, as follows 
for each year: 
Year Refund Requested Refund Allowed Interest Total Refund 
By Unocal by Division on Refund 
1994 $219,117.00 $208,121.43 $53,096.62 $261,218.05 
1995 $204,920.00 $201,168.79 $35,097.07 $236,265.86 
1996 $331,808.00 $331,807.93 $31,417.21 $363,225.14 
1997 $351,659.00 $351,659.00 $5,241.00 $356,900.00 
Total $1,107,504.00 $1,092,757.15 $124,851.90 $1,217,609.05 
69. The refund of tax and interest of $1,217,609.05 was issued to Unocal. 
70. By letter dated October 20, 1999, the Division notified Unocal that it would 
conduct an audit of Unocal in regards to Utah's severance tax for the period January 1, 1994 through 
December 31, 1997.39 
Unocal's Exhibit 4. 
Unocal's Exhibit 6. 
Unocal's Exhibit 7. 
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71 On March 22, 2000, the Division sent a Preliminary Notice - Severance Tax to 
Unocal containing an Audit Summary In the "Explanation of Audit Findings" contained in the Audit 
Summary, the Division stated that 1) Unocal sold their oil production under arm's-length contracts at the 
well or from the unit, 2) the gross value received under those arm's-length contracts is the appropriate 
value for severance tax, and 3) residue gas and NGLs are sold at the plant tailgate40 
72 On December 8, 2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice - Severance Tax 
for the period January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1997, in which it asserted a severance tax deficiency 
in the total amount of $1,082,951 70, plus interest computed to January 7, 2001 in the amount of 
$311,214 49, for a total deficiency of $1,394,166 19 In the explanation of audit findings, the Division 
stated that "[information from Unocal's original and amended severance tax returns were used to 
compute the tax liability for the audit period " 4l 
73 At the Formal Hearing, Ms Goss testified that the Division had used contract 
prices from sales of the oil and gas at the tailgate of the plant as the basis to value Unocal's oil and gas 
74 Ms Goss testified that the Division used the net-back method to calculate the 
value of the NGLs, but only allowed a processing cost deduction of two-thirds (66 2/3%) of the value of 
the NGLs Ms Goss claimed that this was the only deduction the Division allowed regarding Unocal's 
processing costs at the Lisbon Plant 
75 In its Statutory Notice, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the 
oil, gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $43,750 04 for tax year 1994, $43,750 00 for 
tax year 1995, $42,205 85 for tax year 1996, and $39,494 31 for tax year 1997 42 
Unocal's Exhibit 11 
Unocal's Exhibit 13 
Unocal's Exhibit 13, Schedule 1, pp 1 3 d Schedule 4 p 1 
-
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76. Unocal timely appealed the Statutory Notice - Severance Tax, and the appeal 
was docketed as Appeal No. 01-0033. 
77. Unocal and the Division stipulated to a stay of this appeal pending the Tax 
Commission's final decision in xxxxxx v. Auditing Division, USTC Appeal No. 00-0901 ("Appeal No. 00-
0901"). The order granting that motion was signed on December 30, 2002. 
Appeal Nos. 04-1283 and 04-1284 
78. Unocal filed quarterly returns for the periods from January 1, 1998 to June 30, 
1999, for severance taxes on the oil and gas produced from the Mississippian Pool and the McCracken 
Pool in the Lisbon Unit.43 
79. There is no evidence that Unocal filed an annual return for the 1998 tax year. 
80. For the period January to March 1998, Unocal paid severance taxes totaling 
$87,181.62, the amount shown due on its return for this period. Unocal calculated this amount of liability 
by valuing its oil, gas, and NGLs at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant and subtracting minimal deductions, 
as it had done on the original returns it filed for the First Audit Period. For the remaining periods in the 
Second Audit Period, Unocal filed returns that showed no tax liability and paid no severance taxes, as it 
subtracted the total of the processing costs it incurred at the Lisbon Plant from the revenue received at the 
tailgate of the plant.44 
81. There is no evidence that Unocal made any conservation fee payments for the 
periods January 1, 1998 through June 30, 1999. 
82. On May 3, 2004, the Division issued a Preliminary Notice for additional 
severance tax to Unocal for the Second Audit Period. 
Unocal's Exhibit 3. 
Id 
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83. There is no evidence that prior to issuing the May 3, 2004 Preliminary Notice, 
the Division issued a letter or other notice informing Unocal that it would conduct an audit of Unocal in 
regards to Utah's severance tax for the Second Audit Period. 
84. By letter dated June 8, 2004, Unocal informed the Division that it had filed 
quarterly severance tax returns for 1998 and attached copies of those returns. Unocal also informed the 
Division that it had ceased making additional severance tax payments beginning with the second quarter 
of 1998 "due to the fact that [Unocal's] calculations showed no tax due when value is calculated on a net 
back basis or that any amount due was offset by refunds due Unocal from the State."45 
85. The Division contends that on July 8, 2004, it issued Statutory Notices of 
deficiency for severance taxes and conservation fees due for the period January 1, 1998 through 
December 31, 1999, the Second Audit Period. The notices were mailed to Unocal's successor in the 
Lisbon Unit, Tom Brown, Inc., the entity that purchased Unocal's interest in the Lisbon Unit effective 
July 1, 1999. The assessments were not appealed within thirty days of their July 8, 2004 issuance date. 
86. On October 5, 2004, the Division reissued a Statutory Notice - Conservation Fee 
to Unocal for the Second Audit Period, in the amount of $35,315.53, plus interest computed to November 
4, 2004 in the amount of $12,394.19, for a total amount due of $47,709.72.46 Unocal appealed the 
Statutory Notice within thirty days of October 5, 2004, and the appeal was docketed as Appeal No. 04-
1283. 
87. Also on October 5, 2004, the Division reissued a Statutory Notice - Oil and Gas 
Severance Tax to Unocal for the Second Audit Period, in the amount of $591,530.67 of additional tax, 
plus interest computed to November 4, 2004 in the amount of $173,041.26. The Division also assessed a 
10% penalty for failure to file a 1998 annual severance tax return, which totaled $30,740.06. The total 
45
 Unocal's Exhibit 15. 
46
 UnocaPs Exhibit 14. 
~
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severance tax deficiency assessed for the Second Audit Period was $795,311.99.47 Unocal appealed the 
Statutory Notice within thirty days of October 5, 2004, and the appeal was docketed as Appeal No. 04-
1284. 
88. In the Statutory Notices, the Division valued Unocal's gas and NGLs by relying 
on its contract sales price for the products at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant.48 The Division used the 
contract sales prices as the starting point for valuing NGLs, but applied a 70% processing cost allowance 
to the value of the NGLs, thereby employing a net-back method. The Division did not deduct processing 
or transportation costs from the contract prices of the residue gas. 
89. The Division valued the oil by using posted prices for sweet oil at the Giant's 
Paradox Basin.49 
90. The Commission finds that there is no dispute between the parties that the sour 
oil produced from the Mississippian Pool was not of like quality to the sweet oil produced by the Giant's 
Paradox Basin until the sour oil had been processed at the Lisbon Plant. 
91. For tax year 1998, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the oil, 
gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $43,750.05.50 
92. For tax year 1999, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the oil, 
gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $21,875.03.5I According to the Division, the 
available exemption was reduced by 50% because Unocal was the operator only through June 30, 1999; 
i.e., one-half of the year. 
Id. 
/d., Schedules 2-4. 
Id 
Id, Schedule 2, p. 1. 
Id, Schedule 3, p. 1. 
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APPLICABLE LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. §59-5-102(1999)52 imposes a severance tax on oil and gas 
produced from a well in Utah, as follows in pertinent part: 
(l)(a) Each person owning an interest, working interest, royalty interest, 
payments out of production, or any other interest, in oil or gas produced from a 
well in the state, or in the proceeds of the production, shall pay to the state a 
severance tax equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of the oil or gas produced, 
saved, and sold or transported from the field where the substance was produced. 
(f) If the oil or gas is stockpiled, the tax is not applicable until it is sold, 
transported, or delivered. However, oil or gas that is stockpiled for more than 
two years is subject to the severance tax. 
(2) No tax is imposed upon: 
(a) the first $50,000 annually in gross value of each well or wells as defined 
in this part, to be prorated among the owners in proportion to their respective 
interests in the production or in the proceeds of the production. 
2. During the Consolidated Audit Period, UCA §59-5-103 provides that the value of 
oil or gas shall be determined, as follows: 
(1) For purposes of computing the severance tax, the value of oil or gas at 
the well is the value established under an arm's-length contract for the purchase 
of production at the well, or in the absence of such a contract, by the value 
established in accordance with the first applicable of the following methods: 
(a) the value at the well established under a non-arm's length 
contract for the purchase of production at the well, provided that the 
value is equivalent to the value received under comparable arm's-length 
contracts for purchases or sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same 
field; 
(b) the value at the well determined by consideration of information 
relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the well in the same field or 
nearby fields or areas such as: posted prices, prices received in arm's-
length spot sales, or other reliable public sources of price or market 
information; 
(c) the value established using the net-back method as defined in 
Section 59-5-101. 
5
 All citations to the Utah Code contained herein are to the 1999 version of the Code unless 
otherwise indicated 
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(3) Any contract between a parent and a subsidiary company, or between 
companies wholly or partially owned b} a common parent, or between 
companies otherwise affiliated that specifies the value of oil or gas is not arm's-
length unless the value of oil or gas specified is comparable to its fair market 
value as defined under Section 59-2-102 If there is a controversy, the 
commission shall determine the value of the oil or gas 
3 UCA §59-5-101 provides definitions pertaining to Utah's severance tax, as 
follows m relevant part 
(7) "Net-back method" means a method for calculating the fair maiket value 
of oil or gas at the well Under this method, costs of transportation, not to exceed 
50% of the value of the oil or gas, and processing shall be deducted from the 
proceeds received for the oil or gas and any extracted or processed products, or 
from the value of the oil or gas or any extracted or processed products at the first 
point at which the fair-market value for those products is determined by a sale 
pursuant to an arm's-length contract or comparison to othei sales of those 
products Processing and transportation costs shall be deducted only from the 
value of the processed or transported product 
(9) "Oil or gas field" means a geographical area overlying oil or gas 
structures The boundaries of oil or gas fields shall conform with the boundaries 
as fixed by the Board and Division of Oil, Gas and Mining under Title 40, 
Chapter 6 
(11) "Processing costs" means the reasonable actual costs of processing gas 
Processing costs determined by an arm's-length contract are the actual costs 
Wheie processing costs are not determined by an arm's-length contract, including 
those situations where the producei performs the processing for himself, the 
actual costs of processing shall be those reasonable costs associated with the 
actual operating and maintenance expenses, overhead directly attributable and 
allocable to the operation and maintenance, and either depreciation and a return 
on undepreciated capital investment, or a cost equal to a return on the investment 
in the processing facilities as determined by the tax commission The tax 
commission shall adopt rules to implement this definition, and may adopt federal 
regulations where applicable 
(17) "Transportation costs" means the reasonable actual costs of transporting 
oil or gas products from the well to the point of sale except the transportation 
allowance deduction may not exceed 50% of the value of the oil or gas 
Transportation costs determined by an arm's-length contract are the actual costs 
Where transportation costs are not deteimined b} an arm's-length contract, 
including those situations where the producer performs the transportation seivice 
for himself, the actual costs of transportation shall be those reasonable costs 
- 2 0 -
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associated with the actual operating and maintenance expenses, overhead costs 
directly attributable and allocable to the operation and maintenance, and either 
depreciation and a return on undepreciated capital investment, or a cost equal to a 
return on the investment in the transportation system as determined by the tax 
commission. The tax commission shall adopt rules to implement this definition, 
and may adopt federal regulations where applicable. 
(19) "Value at the weir' means the value of oil or gas at the point production 
is completed. 
(20) "Well or wells" means any extractive means from which oil or gas is 
produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one 
person. 
4. In 1990, the Utah Legislature passed House Bill 63 ("H.B. 63), entitled "Oil and 
Gas Severance Tax Amendments." Although not codified, H.B. 63 provides in Section 4 that "[t]he 
applicable federal regulations remain in effect until the commission makes the rules authorized by this 
chapter." 1990 Laws of Utah, ch. 247, sec. 4. 
5. The 2007 version of the MMS federal regulations53 provides guidance 
concerning the valuation of residue gas and gas plant products. 30 C.F.R. §206.153(a)(2) provides that 
"[t]he value of production, for royalty purposes, of gas subject to this section shall be the combined value 
of the residue gas and all gas plant products determined pursuant to this section, . . . less applicable 
transportation allowances and processing allowances determined pursuant to this subpart." 
6. 30 C.F.R. 206.151(3) of the federal regulations provides definitions, as follows in 
pertinent part: 
Allowance means a deduction in determining value for royalty purposes. 
Processing allowance means an allowance for the reasonable, actual costs of 
processing gas determined under this subpart. Transportation allowance means 
an allowance for the reasonable, actual costs of moving unprocessed gas, residue 
The parties have quoted limited portions of the 1999 version of the MMS federal regulations in 
their briefs and in other evidence. The Commission notes that the 1999 regulations the parties quoted are 
identical to those found in the 2007 version of the regulations. For this reason and because there is no 
evidence to suggest that the federal regulations in effect for the years at issue are different from the 
current regulations, the Commission has relied on the 2007 version of the federal regulations. 
-21 -
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gas, or gas plant products to a point of sale or delivery off the lease, unit area, or 
communitized area, or away from a processing plant. The transportation 
allowance does not include gathering costs. 
Gathering means the movement of lease production to a central accumulation 
and/or treatment point on the lease, unit or communitized area, or to a central 
accumulation or treatment point off the lease, unit or communitized area as 
approved by BLM or MMS OCS operations personnel for onshore and OCS 
leases, respectively. 
7. 30 C.F.R. §206.158(c) provides for limitations of processing costs when valuing 
gas and also provides for exceptions to the limitations, as follows in pertinent part: 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, the processing 
allowance shall not applied against the value of residue gas. Where there is no 
residue gas MMS may designate an appropriate gas plant product against which 
no allowance may be applied. 
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this section, the processing 
allowance deduction on the basis of an individual product shall not exceed 66 2/3 
percent of the value of each gas plant product determined in accordance with 
§206.153 of this subpart (such value to be reduced first for any transportation 
allowances related to postprocessing transportation authorized by §206.156 of 
this subpart). 
(3) Upon request of a lessee, MMS may approve a processing allowance in 
excess of the limitation prescribed by paragraph (c)(2) of this section. The lessee 
must demonstrate that the processing costs incurred in excess of the limitation 
prescribed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section were reasonable, actual, and 
necessary. An application for exception (using Form MMS-4393, Request to 
Exceed Regulatory Allowance Limitation) shall contain all relevant and 
supporting documentation for MMS to make a determination. Under no 
circumstances shall the value for royalty purposes of any gas plant product be 
reduced to zero. 
8. UCA §40-6-14 imposes a ''conservation fee" on the value of oil and gas 
produced in Utah, as follows in pertinent part: 
(1) There is levied a fee of .002 of the value at the well of oil and gas: 
(a) produced and saved; 
(b) sold; or 
(c) transported from the premises in Utah where the oil or gas is 
produced. 
- 2 2 -
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9. For purposes of establishing the amount of the Section 59-5-102(2) annual 
exemption, Utah Admin. Rule R865-150-1(B) provides that "[t]he proportion of the annual exemption an 
operator is entitled to shall be reduced by any exempt royalties." 
10. Utah Code Ann. §59-5-104 provides that a producer shall file an annual 
statement or return as follows: 
(1) Every producer engaged in the production of oil or gas from any well or 
wells in the state shall file with the commission, on or before June 1 of each year, 
on forms furnished by the commission, a statement.. . . 
(2) The statements or reports required to be filed with the commission shall be 
signed and sworn to by the producer or a designee. 
11. Utah Code Ann. §59-5-106 provides for the imposition of penalties and interest 
for purposes of the severance tax, as follows in pertinent part: 
(1) In case of any failure to make or file a return required by this chapter, the 
penalty provided in Section 59-1-401 and interest at the rate and in the manner 
prescribed in Section 59-1-402 shall be charged and added to the tax. The 
amount so added to any tax, whether as a penalty, interest, or both, shall be 
collected at the same time and in the same manner and as a part of the tax. 
12. Utah Code Ann. §59-1-401 provides for the imposition and waiver of penalties, 
as follows in pertinent part: 
(l)(a) The penalty for failure to file a tax return within the time prescribed by 
law including extensions is the greater of $20 or 10% of the unpaid tax due on 
the return. 
(10) Upon making a record of its actions, and upon reasonable cause shown, 
the commission may waive, reduce, or compromise any of the penalties or 
interest imposed under this part. 
13. On November 25, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in 
ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2003 UT 53, 86 P.3d 706 (Utah 2003), in which it 
determined that severance taxes should be based on the value of oil and gas "in the immediate vicinity of 
- 2 3 -
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the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state ' In its decision, the Court included 
prospective language limiting the application of its decision to other taxpayers, as follows 
III APPLICATION OF OUR DECISION 
The revenue concerns cited by the Tax Commission and amici convince 
us that application of our prospective effect doctrine is appropriate in this case 
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but 
ExxonMobil the mle announced today is to have prospective application onl} 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the Tax Commission's determination that severance taxes 
should be based on the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual sale 
Valuation must occur in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the oil and gas 
remaining in a relatively natural state Although ExxonMobil is entitled to 
further adjudication of its claim for a refund, as to other parties who may have 
refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the 
Tax Commission, our holding is to apply prospectively only Reversed 
DISCUSSION 
At issue in this case is the value of oil, gas and NGLs that Unocal produced from the 
Lisbon Unit for purposes of Utah's severance tax and conservation fees Prior to addressing the valuation 
issue, however, the Commission will consider two preliminary issues 1) whether Unocal timeh filed 
Petitions for Redetermination in Appeal Nos 04-1283 and 04-1284, which concern tax yeais 1998 and 
1999, the Second Audit Period, and 2) whether the Commission may apply the guidance provided by the 
Utah Supieme Court in ExxonMobil to determine a value for Unocal's oil, gas and NGLs toi any of the 
tax periods in this case 
After addressing the above, the Commission will consider those issues arising from the 
Division's assessments, including 1) whether Unocal has met its buiden of showing that the Division 
erred m its choice of valuation methods for the oil, gas and NGLs Unocal produced and, if so, has Unocal 
provided a sound evidentiary basis upon which the Commission could adopt a lower valuation, 2) 
whether the Division properly applied the $50,000 annual exemption as provided in Section 59-5-102(2), 
- 2 4 -
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and 3) whether cause exists to abate or to waive the 10% failure to file penalty the Division imposed due 
to Unocal not filing an annual severance tax return for the 1998 tax year 
I. Jurisdiction to Hear Appeal Nos. 04-1283 and 04-1284. 
At the Formal Hearing, the Division asserted that Unocal did not timely file these two 
appeals and that, as a result, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to address the appeals The 
Commission, however, believes that it would be inequitable for it to dismiss the two appeals under the 
circumstances The Division initially issued its Statutory Notices for the Second Audit Period on July 8, 
2004 However, it issued them not to Unocal but to Unocal's successor in the Lisbon Unit, eight days 
after the June 30, 2004 date on which Unocal transferred its interest in the unit The Commission 
recognizes that the Division issued the Preliminary Notice to Unocal in May 2004 and that Unocal 
responded to the Preliminary Notice in June 2004 No statute in the Utah Oil and Gas Severance Tax Act 
provides specific guidance as to whom the Division should send a notice of deficiency Nevertheless, the 
Commission finds that on July 8, 2004, when the Division issued its Statutory Notices, Unocal had 
transferred its interest in the Lisbon Unit to the successor and because the Division was aware ot the 
change of ownership, it was appropriate for the Division to issue the notices to the successor 
However, the Division reissued the Statutory Notices to Unocal in October 2004, after 
which Unocal filed the two appeals at issue within 30 days Filing an appeal under these circumstances 
appears to comply with Utah Code Ann §59-5-109, which provides that "[i]f any person feels aggrieved 
because of the amount of the severance tax determined by the commission, the person may file a request 
for agency action with the commission within 30 days after notice is mailed to the person, requesting an 
adjudicative proceeding and the coriection of the assessed tax" (emphasis added) Within 30 days after 
the notices were mailed to Unocal, Unocal requested agency action Based on these specific facts, the 
Commission finds that it has jurisdiction to address the issues in Appeal Nos 04-1283 and 04 1284 
- 2 5 -
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II. Prospective Application of ExxonMobil. 
In ExxonMobil, the Utah Supreme Court "reverse[d] the Tax Commission's 
determination that severance taxes should be based on the value of oil and gas at the point of eventual 
sale " The Court determined that "[valuation must occur in the immediate vicinity of the well, with the 
oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state " The Court specifically limited the application of its 
decision, however, providing that "whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but 
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only " Unocal and the Division 
disagree on how the prospectivity language applies to this case 
The applicable facts are as follows The Utah Supreme Court issued ExxonMobil on 
November 25, 2003, nearly four years after 1999, the last year at issue in this case Auditing Division 
issued its Statutory Notice for the First Audit Period, 1994 through 1997, on December 8, 2000, almost 
three years prior to the Court's decision As to the Second Audit Period, 1998 and 1999, there is no 
evidence that the Division expressly informed Unocal that it planned to audit or assess additional tax until 
it issued a May 3, 2004 Piehminary Notice, more than five months after the Court's decision 
Nevertheless, the Division argues that it was "working" on the audit for the Second Audit Period when 
ExxonMobil was issued 
A Division's Arguments The Division argues that the ExxonMobil ruling may 
only be applied to taxes that accrue on or after the date it was issued, November 25, 2003 Because this 
case concerns tax years 1994 through 1999, years for which taxes had accrued prior to ExxonMobil, and 
because all of the Division's assessments were issued within applicable statutes of limitation, the Diusion 
contends that all taxes and tees at issue were pending when the Court ruled m ExxonMobil Tor these 
reasons, the Division argues that the prospectivity language m ExxonMobil precludes the Commission 
from considering the Court's guidance when addressing all three appeals in this case 
- 2 6 -
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B. Unocal's Arguments. Unocal argues that the Commission may apply the Court's 
ruling in ExxonMobil to all three appeals. First, Unocal argues that the Court's proclamation of selective 
prospectivity is dictum that does not control the outcome of this case, because the circumstances in 
ExxonMobil concerned refunds of taxes already paid while this case concerns deficiency assessments that 
do not implicate taxes already paid and spent. Unocal also notes that this view was taken recently by the 
Second District Court in a ruling on a Motion to Compel in Case No. 060700437 {River Gas Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'«) (October 19, 2006). 
Second, Unocal argues that the Utah Supreme Court stated in Kennecott Corp. v. State 
Tax Comm 'n, 862 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1993), that the prospective relief doctrine is appropriate when there is 
"justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law . . ." Unocal argues that until the Court gave guidance in 
ExxonMobil, there was no "prior state of the law" upon which to rely. In support of this position, Unocal 
explains that the Court declared in ExxonMobil that the severance tax statute was ambiguous. 
Furthermore, Unocal contends that the Commission itself changed its interpretation of the statute when it 
initially accepted Unocal's net-back approach and granted a refund for the First Audit Period, then 
rejected the approach by issuing an assessment for the refunded amounts. For these reasons, Unocal 
argues that the ExxonMobil ruling should be considered the equivalent of an advisory opinion regarding 
the proper analysis to follow in interpreting the severance tax statute. 
Third, even if the Commission believes it is bound by the prospectivity language in 
ExxonMobil, Unocal argues that the Commission must narrowly interpret that language so that it does not 
apply to tax years 1998 and 1999, the Second Audit Period. Unocal points out that in the one-paragraph 
conclusion in ExxonMobil, the Court specifically stated that its ruling would only apply to "refund 
requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission" (emphasis 
added). Because the assessments for 1998 and 1999 were not issued until eight months after ExxonMobil, 
- 2 7 -
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Unocal argues that there was no matter relating to these years was pending before the Tax Commission 
As a result, Unocal argues that the Commission should apply the guidance in ExxonMobil to Appeal Nos 
04-1283 and 04-1284 Unocal states to do otherwise would allow the Division to impose deficiency 
assessments on taxpayers after the Court has rejected the Division's interpretation of the severance tax 
Fourth, should the Commission agree that the Court's guidance in ExxonMobil may be 
applied to Appeal Nos 04-1283 and 04-1284 for the Second Audit Period, Unocal argues that the 
Commission should also apply that guidance to the tax years comprising the First Audit Period To do 
otherwise, Unocal argues, would be arbitrary and capricious and raise due process and equal protection 
concerns because all three appeals raise identical issues Unocal contends that a different outcome for the 
two audit periods would violate its constitutional right to uniform operation of laws under article I, 
section 24, and article XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution 
C Commission's Analysis and Conclusion The Commission rejects Unocal's 
argument that the Court's prospectivity language should be regaided as dictum for deficiency cases, 
because the Court specifically stated that its prospective application applied to such proceedings 
Similarly, the Commission rejects Unocal's argument that ExxonMobil may be considered an advisory 
opinion, as such a result would also contradict the Court's stated application of its ruling Furthermoie, 
prospective application of a ruling necessarily results in the possibility of different outcomes for different 
circumstances As a result, the Commission rejects Unocal's argument that its rights to due process and 
equal protection would be violated, should the Commission apply the ruling to some ot the tax years at 
issue and not to others 
Lastl>, the Commission addresses Unocal's argument that the ExxonMobil ruling must be 
applied to the appeals relating to tax years 1998 and 1999 because these appeals were not "pending" on 
November 25, 2003, the date ExxonMobil was issued The Commission iejects Unocal s argument that 
- 2 8 -
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the word "pending" requires the Commission to apply the Court's ruling to periods prior to November 25, 
2003 that were not yet under appeal when ExxonMobil was issued 
The Commission places emphasis on the Court's statement that "whether in refund 
requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have 
prospective application only " The Commission interprets this language to mean that the Court intended 
all taxpayers, with the exception of ExxonMobil, to be treated equally for those periods that occurred 
prior to November 25, 2003 Otherwise, depending on when an assessment was imposed or a refund 
claim was made, some taxpayers would benefit from the more favorable interpretation of the severance 
tax statutes as provided in ExxonMobil, while other taxpayers would not 
For example, assume that a taxpayer purposefully evaded and failed to file and pay taxes 
for the 2001 tax year and that the Division did not discover and assess this taxpayer until 2004, after the 
Court issued ExxonMobil If the Commission accepted Unocal's argument that only "pending" matters 
would be denied the benefit of the Court's guidance, this hypothetical tax evader would receive more 
favorable tax treatment than a taxpayer who timely filed and paid its 2001 taxes but was audited puor to 
the issuance of ExxonMobil In addition, a taxpayer who waited to file a refund request for the 2001 tax 
year after November 25, 2003 would receive more favorable tax treatment than a taxpayer who filed its 
refund request for the same year earlier, prior to November 25, 2003 The Commission does not believe 
that the Utah Supreme Court intended such results to occur Accordingly, the Commission interprets the 
Court's prospectivity language as putting all taxpayers, except for ExxonMobil, on a "level playing field" 
for those periods that occurred prior to November 25, 2003, when ExxonMobil was issued 
For these reasons, the Commission finds that the date the taxes accrued is the critical 
factor in determining whether or not to apply the Court's ruling in ExxonMobil when calculating the tax 
base As a result, for taxes that accrued before the November 25, 2003 date on which ExxonMobil was 
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issued, the Commission may not apply the Court's ruling For taxes that accrued on or after November 
25, 2003, the Court's ruling may be applied All taxes at issue in this case accrued prior to November 25, 
2003 and relate to a taxpayer other than ExxonMobil Accordingly, the Commission finds that it is 
precluded from applying the Court's ruling in ExxonMobil to any portion of this case 
III. Valuation of Unocal's Oil, Gas and NGLs. 
Even though we must apply the Division's pre-ExxonMobil interpretation of the 
severance tax statutes, we must still determine whether the Division properly applied that interpretation to 
the specific facts of this case Prior to determining whether the Division's assessments are correct, the 
Commission will first address 1) Unocal's argument that the Division's reliance on erroneous 
information invalidates its assessments for all periods, and 2) the Division's argument that language in 
Subsection 59-5-103(3) is applicable to the Commission's interpretation of Subsection 59-5-103(1) 
A. Unocal's Argument that Assessments are Based on an Erroneous Assumption 
Unocal contends that even if the Commission applies its pre-ExxonMobil interpretation of the severance 
tax statutes to this case, the Division's assessments cannot be sustained because they were based on a 
critical and erroneous fact Specifically, Unocal argues that the Division imposed its assessments under 
the erroneous assumption that the Lisbon Plant was located on the Lisbon Unit, the field from which 
Unocal extracted the oil, gas and NGLs at issue 
Section 59-5-102(l)(a) imposes the severance tax on the value of the oil or gas 
"produced, saved, and sold or transported from the field where the substance was produced' (emphasis 
added) Unocal contends that prior to ExxonMobil, the Commission interpreted Section 59-5 102(l)(a) to 
mean that the point of production where value is determined must be in the "field " Unocal also contends 
that this interpretation was supported b} the testimony of Ms Goss, who stated that prior to ExxonMobil, 
the Division's practice was to value the oil oi gas at the point it was sold or transported from the field 
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Ms Goss also admitted that if the Lisbon Plant was not located on the Lisbon Unit, "the proper point of 
valuation would be before [the oil and gas] went into the plant" Because it was shown at the Formal 
Hearing that the Lisbon Plant was not located on the Lisbon Unit, Unocal argues that the Division's 
assessments are not in compliance with the Commission's $ve-ExxonMobil interpretation of the severance 
tax statutes and are, as a result, invalid 
The Commission, however, is not convinced that the location of the processing plant is 
critical to its pre-ExxonMobil interpretation of the severance tax statutes Ms Goss's testimony does not 
appear to clarify the Commission's pre-ExxonMobil interpretation, as she later testified that valuation 
occurs where the production stream is separated for the last time, even if this occurs off the field 
Accordingly, the Commission does not find that the Division's assessments are invalid due to the 
Division's erroneous assumption that the Lisbon Plant was located on the Lisbon Unit 
B Division's Argument Concerning Subsection 59-5-103(3) The Division argues 
that when a controversy exists concerning the valuation of oil or gas under Subsection 59-5-103(1), 
Subsection 59-5-103(3) authorizes the Commission to "determine the value of the oil or gas" The 
Commission, howevei, does not agree with the Division's argument The Commission finds that the 
authorization granted in Subsection 59-5-103(3) applies only to that subsection, which concerns contracts 
between affiliated companies, and does not apply to Subsection 59-5-103(1) As there is no evidence that 
Unocal's contracts to sell its oil, gas and NGLs were between such affiliated companies, the Commission 
finds that the authorization granted in Subsection 59-5-103(3) is nrelevant to this appeal 
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C Value of Unocal's Oil Gas and NGLs for All Periods Using Commission's Pre-
ExxonMobil Practices The Legislature has provided the standards for determining the value of oil and 
gas products and given the standards a specified order of priority For all periods at issue, Section 59-5-
103(1) provides that value is to be established in accordance with the first applicable of the following four 
methods 
a The value established under an arm's-length contract for the purchase of 
production at the well Subsection 59-5-103(1) 
b The value established under a non-arm's length contract for the purchase of 
production at the well Subsection 59-5-103(l)(a) 
c The value at the well determined by consideration of information relevant in 
valuing like-quality oil or gas at the well Subsection 59-5-103(l)(b) 
d The value established using the net-back method as defined in Section 59-5-101 
Subsection 59-5- 103(l)(c) 
1. Valuation of Unocal's Oil and Gas Prior to ExxonMobil, the Division valued oil 
and residue gas at "the point of eventual sale" In compliance with this piactice, the Division assessed 
Unocal's oil and residue gas at this point for all periods comprising the Consolidated Audit Penod The 
Division used prices from arm's-length contracts at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant to value Unocal's 
residue gas for all six years at issue and to value its oil for the four years comprising the First Audit 
Period In addition, the Division valued Unocal's oil for the Second Audit Period using posted prices for 
oil that was in a similar "sweet" state as Unocal's oil at the point of eventual sale, l e , the tailgate of the 
Lisbon Plant 
The Division's use of arm's-length contracts, in accordance with the first valuation 
described in Section 59-5-103(1), and posted prices, in accordance with the third valuation method, to 
value Unocal's oil and residue gas are both preferable to Unocal's proposed net-back approach, the fourth 
and least preferable method For these reasons the Commission finds that the Division1? assessments aie 
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correct, given its pre-ExxonMobil practices. Accordingly, the Commission sustains the Division's 
assessments of additional severance tax and conservation fees on the oil and residue gas that Unocal 
produced for all tax years at issue. 
2. Valuation of Unocal 1s NGLs. In its assessments for all years at issue, the 
Division valued Unocal's NGLs using the net-back method. The Division's pre-ExxonMobil practice of 
using the net-back method to value NGLs establishes this product's value at a point that is different from 
the point of eventual sale at which the Division valued oil and residue gas and which the Court considered 
in ExxonMobil. Although Unocal agrees with the Division that the net-back method should be used to 
value its NGLs, it argues that the Division has misapplied the method and overvalued its NGLs. 
In the parties' respective net-back methods, both used arm's-length sales prices at the 
tailgate of the Lisbon Plant to determine the revenue Unocal received from its NGLs. From this revenue, 
Unocal deducted processing costs of 100%, thereby reducing the value of its NGLs to zero. The Division, 
however, limited the deduction for processing costs to 66 2/3% for tax years 1994 through 1997, the First 
Audit Period, and to 70% for tax years 1998 and 1999, the Second Audit Period. 
In it Statutory Notice for the First Audit Period, the Division explained that it limited the 
deduction for processing costs in accordance with the MMS federal regulations, specifically stating: 
Federal regulations allow for a processing cost allowance to be taken against the 
value of natural gas liquids only. The allowance is typically limited to a 
deduction of up to 66 2/3% of the value of the liquids or the actual costs, 
whichever is less, but can be as high as 99% of the liquid value if the processing 
costs are extraordinary and the Minerals Management Service has approved an 
extraordinary allowance. (Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §206-158(c)). 
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For the Second Audit Period, the Division allowed a processing cost allowance of 70% against the 
revenue generated by the NGLs, explaining in its Statutory Notices that the "price per unit was obtained 
from sales contracts]" and "received a 70% processing allowance "54 
The Division asserts that its net-back method is correct because Utah law requires it to 
apply the limitations found in the federal regulations when determining the processing costs that may be 
deducted First, the Division notes that in 1990, the Legislature passed H B 63, in which it enacted the 
net-back valuation method and provided definitions of "net-back method" and "processing costs " The 
last sentence in the definition of "processing costs" provides that "[t]he tax commission shall adopt rules 
to implement this definition, and may adopt federal regulations where apphcable " Second, in Section 4 
of HB 63, the Legislature provided that "[t]he applicable federal regulations remain in effect until the 
commission makes the rules authorized by this chapter " Although Section 4 is not codified, it became 
and appears to remain Utah law 
Unocal, however, argues that the Division's limitation of processing costs does not 
comply with Utah statutory definitions Section 59-5-101(7) defines "net-back method" as an approach in 
which the "costs of processing shall be deducted from the proceeds received for the oil or gas and any 
extracted or processed products[ ]" Furthermore, "processing costs" and "transportation costs" aie 
defined in Sections 59-5-101(11) and 59-5-101(17), respectively, to include costs associated with the 
actual operating and maintenance expenses, depreciation and a return on investment Pursuant to these 
definitions, Unocal aigues that Utah law does not restrict the amount of processing costs that may be 
deducted in the net-back method to detennine the value of NGLs Because its processing costs exceeded 
The Di\ ision argues that 30% of the costs associated with the Lisbon Plant are attnbutable to the 
'production" of helium and sulfur and should not be considered processing costs associated with the 
production of NGLs See Div ision s Exhibit 53 
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the revenue it received for its NGLs, Unocal argues that the Division's use of the processing costs 
limitations in the federal regulations to determine the value of its NGLs is improper 
In the alternative, Unocal argues that even if the Commission finds the federal regulations 
to be applicable, Unocal provided evidence showing that it received authorization from MMS to deduct 
up to 99%) of the value of the NGLs it processed at the Lisbon Plant for four of the six tax years at issue, 
specifically tax years 1996 through 1999 55 Unocal received the authorization pursuant to 30 C F R 
§206 158(c)(3), which provides 
Upon request of a lessee, MMS may approve a processing allowance in excess of 
the [66 2/3%o] limitation prescribed by paragraph (c)(2) of this section The lessee 
must demonstrate that the processing costs incurred in excess of the limitation 
prescribed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section were reasonable, actual, and 
necessary An application for exception (using Form MMS-4393, Request to 
Exceed Regulatory Allowance Limitation) shall contain all relevant and 
supporting documentation for MMS to make a determination Under no 
circumstances shall the value for royalty purposes of any gas plant product be 
reduced to zero 
Because the MMS determined that Unocal's processing costs exceeded the value of its NGLs for these 
four years and approved the reporting of actual processing costs up to 99%o of the value of the NGLs, 
Unocal contends that the Division's limitation of processing cost at 66 2/3% and 70% foi these years is 
erroneous 
The Commission agrees with the Division that Utah law requires it to apply the federal 
regulations First, the definitions of "processing costs" and "transportation costs" in Section 59-5-101 
each include the following statement "The tax commission shall adopt rules to implement this definition, 
and may adopt federal regulations where applicable " Second, Section 4 of HB 63 provides that the 
"applicable federal regulations remain in effect until the commission makes the rules authorized by [the 
Utah Oil and Gas Severance Tax Act] " Because the Commission has never adopted rules implementing 
^ Unocal s Exhibit 16 
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the definitions of "processing costs" and "transportation costs,' the Commission finds that it is bound by 
the federal regulations However, if the federal regulations are silent as to an issue, the Commission finds 
that it may employ the guidance found in the Section 59-5-101 net-back definitions 56 
Unocal has submitted evidence showing that the total of its processing costs and 
transportation costs attributable to NGLs exceeds the revenue generated by its NGLs for all periods at 
issue However, Unocal calculated these costs using the guidance found in the Section 59-5-101 net-back 
definitions only, without consideration of any limitations found in the federal regulations 
In the federal regulations, 30 C F R §206 153(a)(2) provides that that value of processed 
gas, including NGLs, "shall be the combined value of the residue gas and all gas products less 
applicable transportation allowances and processing allowances determined pursuant to this subpart " In 
valuing Unocal's NGLs in its assessments, the Division allowed a processing allowance of 66 2/3% for 
the 1994 through 1997 tax years and a 70% processing allowance for the 1998 and 1999 tax yeais The 
Division did not allow any transportation allowance for any period at issue The Commission must 
determined if Unocal has shown the Division's allowances to be incorrect 
Processing Allowance In 30 C F R §206 151(3), "processing allowance" is defined to 
mean "an allowance for the reasonable, actual costs of processing gas" In Section 206 158(c)(2), 
however, the processing allowance for NGLs is limited to 66 2/3%, unless MMS approves a processing 
allowance in excess of this limitation For tax years 1996 through 1999, Unocal submitted evidence 
56
 In 2005, the Commission issued a second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final 
Decision ("Second Final Decision") in Appeal No 00-0901, in which it concluded that the federal 
regulations did not govern the net-back calculation However, in that case, the Division only argued that 
the federal regulations applied because of the references m the definitions of "processing costs" and 
"transportation costs," as found in Section 59-5-101 Until the Commission heaid this case, the 
Commission was unaware that a valid statute, specifically Section 4 of H B 63 (1990), mandated use of 
the federal regulations until rules were promulgated to implement the applicable Section 59-5-101 
definitions For these reasons, the Commission now believes that the federal regulations must be 
consideied when determining the costs that may be deducted in the net-back method 
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showing that MMS approved an excess processing allowance not to exceed 99% of the value of NGLs 
produced at the Lisbon Plant As a result, the Commission finds that the 66 2/3% processing allowance 
the Division used to value Unocal's NGLs for the 1996 and 1997 tax years and the 70% processing 
allowance it used for the 1998 and 1999 tax years should be increased to the excess processing costs 
approved by MMS, not to exceed 99%) for each year The Commission, however, sustains the Division's 
use of a 66 2/3% processing allowance to value Unocal's NGLs for the 1994 and 1995 tax years 
Transportation Allowance Section 206 158(c)(3) provides that "[ujnder no 
circumstances shall the value for royalty purposes of [NGLs] be reduced to zero " The Commission has 
determined that a processing allowance of up to 99%> is to be used in valuing Unocal's NGLs for the 1996 
through 1999 tax years Accordingly, the Commission finds that it is precluded from applying a 
transportation allowance for these years, if any further reduction would reduce the value of the NGLs to 
zero However, the Commission must still determine whether Unocal has shown that a "transportation 
allowance," as defined under the federal regulations, is permitted when valuing its NGLs for 1994 and 
1995 
In Section 206 151(3) of the federal regulations, "transportation allowance" is defined to 
mean "an allowance for the reasonable, actual costs of moving unprocessed gas, residue gas, or gas plant 
products to a point of sale or delivery off the lease, unit area, or communitized area, or away from a 
processing plant The transportation allowance does not include gathering costs " "Gathering" is defined 
in the same subsection as 'the movement of lease production to a central accumulation and/or treatment 
point on the lease unit or communitized area, or to a central accumulation or treatment point off the lease, 
unit or communitized aiea as approved by BLM or MMS OCS operations personnel for onshore and OCS 
leases, respectivelv " 
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Unocal has shown that although the Lisbon Plant in located near the Lisbon Unit, it is not 
located on the Lisbon Unit, as the Division believed when it issued its assessments At the hearing, the 
Division's witness, Ms Goss, testified that it would be appropriate to deduct transportation costs if the 
plant is not located on the unit "Transportation allowance" is defined to include those costs associated 
with moving unprocessed gas off the lease or unit area As a result, it would appear that when 
establishing the value of Unocal's NGLs for 1994 and 1995, it would be appropnate to deduct those 
transportation costs that are allocable to its NGLs and that it incurred to move its unprocessed gas from 
the Lisbon Unit to the Lisbon Plant, as long as those costs did not include "gathering" costs to move its 
"production to a central accumulation point on the lease " 
In Unocal's Exhibit 9 and Exhibit 34, Unocal shows that its total "post production costs" 
were divided between "field gathering" costs of 8% and "plant costs" of 92% The "field gathering" costs 
appear to be associated with three gathering lines that bring the full well stream to the plant (Tab 1 of the 
Exhibit 34) Furthermore, Unocal's Exhibit 36 indicates that trom 1975 through 1997, Unocal's total 
investment in the Lisbon Unit "field" is approximately 15% of its total investment in the Lisbon Unit 
"plant" and "field" together However, nowhere in these exhibits does Unocal appear to indicate what 
portion of its transportation costs are allocable to NGLs or whether any of its field gathering costs are 
associated with those "gathering costs" that are excludable under the federal regulations For these 
reasons, the Commission finds that Unocal has not shown what amount of transportation costs, if any, 
may be deducted when valuing its NGLs for the 1994 and 1995 tax years Accordingly, the Commission 
sustains the Division's valuation of Unocal's NGLs for the 1994 and 1995 tax years 
D Valuation Summary Under the Commission's pre ExxonMobil interpretation of 
the severance tax statutes, the Commission rejects Unocal's proposed use of the net-back method to value 
the oil and residue gas it produced during all tax > ears at issue 
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In addition, the Commission rejects Unocal's net-back calculations in regards to the 
NGLs it produced during all tax years at issue because they do not reflect the limitations found in the 
federal regulations Nevertheless, the Commission finds that the Unocal has shown that under the federal 
regulations, a processing allowance of up to 99% must be used to value its NGLs for tax years 1996 
through 1999 
Based on the forgoing, the Commission sustains the Division's assessments of additional 
severance tax and conservation fees on the oil and residue gas that Unocal produced for all years 
comprising the Consolidated Audit Period For Unocal's NGLs, the Commission sustains the Division's 
assessment of additional severance tax foi the 1994 and 1995 tax years, but finds that the Division 
assessments of additional severance tax and conservation fees for the 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 years 
should be reduced to reflect a processing allowance for MMS allowed processing costs of up to 99% 
IV. Section 59-5-102(2) Annual Exemption. 
Unocal contends that the Division did not properly apply the $50,000 annual exemption 
that is authorized m Section 59-5-102(2)(a) Unocal was the operator of approximately 30 wells in the 
Lisbon Unit during the tax years at issue Unocal operated the wells for the entirety of tax years 1994 
through 1998 Unocal also operated the wells from January 1, 1999 through June 30, 1999, or one-half of 
the 1999 tax year 
Section 59-5-102(2)(a) provides that no severance tax is imposed upon "the first $50,000 
annually in gross value ot each well or wells as defined in this part, to be prorated among the owners in 
proportion to their iespective interests in the production oi in the proceeds of the production" For 
purposes of Section 59-5-102, ' well or wells" is defined in Section 59-5-101(20) to mean "any extractive 
means from which oil or gas is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by 
one person " 
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The Division applied the annual exemption as follows First, the Division determined 
that for each tax year, Section 59-5-102(2)(a) only provides foi one $50,000 annual exemption to be 
applied to the value of all oil, gas and NGLs produced by Unocal in the Lisbon Unit, regardless of the 
number of wells operated Second, for the 1999 tax year, the Division limited the exemption to $25,000, 
reducing the $50,000 exemption by half because Unocal was the operator for only one-half of the tax 
year Third, the Division reduced the exemption for all years to account for exempt royalties paid to 
government entities in accordance with Rule R865-150-1(B), which provides that the "proportion of the 
annual exemption an operator is entitled to shall be i educed by any exempt royalties " Unocal argues that 
the Division's application of the annual exemption is incorrect for several reasons 
A One Exemption Per Field First, Unocal contends that under the plain language 
of Sections 59-5-102(2)(a) and 59-5-101(20), Unocal is entitled to a $50,000 exemption for each well in 
the unit, arguing that no language exists in the statute or the administrative rules to support the Division's 
claim that there is only a single exemption for each field The Division contends, howevei, that the 
Commission has historically interpreted Section 59-5-102(2)(a) to allow only one exemption per field, 
regardless of the numbei of wells operated Furthermore, the Division argues that the definition of "well 
or wells' in Section 59-5-101(20) expressly provides that a field, not a "well," is the unit to which the 
exemption applies 
The Commission agrees with the Division's application ot one annual exemption per 
field Were Unocal s interpretation correct, the Legislature could have provided in Section ^9-5-
102(2)(a) for the exemption to apply to the gross value of "each well" Instead, it provided for the 
exemption to appl} to "each well or wells as defined in this part' The Commission is hesitant to 
interpret this phrase "each well or wells as defined in this part" to mean "each well" because doing could 
give no effect to the lemamdei of the legislative language 
- 4 0 -
0d(J04 
Appeal Nos 01-0033, 04-1283 & 04-1284 
In addition, the Commission notes that Section 59-5-101(20) defines "well or wells," for 
purposes of Section 59-5-102(2)(a), to mean "any extractive means located within and oil or gas field, 
and operated by one person " When the Commission considers the two statutes together, it appears that a 
$50,000 annual exemption is allowed for each extractive means that is located within an oil or gas field 
and operated by one peison Although Unocal may operate up to 30 wells in the Lisbon Unit, there is no 
evidence to suggest that each well should be considered a separate extractive means On the contrary, the 
operation of a number of wells to extract oil and gas would appear to be a single means of extraction 
Accordingly, the Commission finds that the historical practice of allowing one annual exemption per field 
appears consistent with the language of Sections 59-5-102(2)(a) and 59-5-101(20), particularly when the 
Commission must construe an exemption narrowly against the taxpayer See Parson Asphalt Prods , Inc 
v State Tax Comm n, 617 P 2d 397 (Utah 1980) 
B Reduction of Exemption for 1999 Second, Unocal contends that the Division's 
limitation of the exemption to $25,000 for the 1999 tax year is mcoirect Unocal argues that although it 
sold its interest in the Lisbon Field and no longer operated it after June 30, 1999, no language in the 
statutes or rules authorizes the Division to reduce the exemption by 50% under such circumstances The 
Commission disagrees Section 59-5-102(2)(a) specifically provides that the $50,000 exemption shall be 
"prorated among the owners in proportion to their respective interests in the production or in the proceeds 
of the production " Unocal maintained an interest in and participated in the proceeds of the production 
from the Lisbon Unit for only one-half of the 1999 tax year Accordingly, it would appear that Section 
59-5-102(2)(a) mandates the Division to prorate the annual exemption when determining Unocal's tax 
liability for a year in which it did not share in the proceeds and production for the entire year For these 
reasons, the Commission finds that the Division properly reduced Unocal's annual exemption by one-half 
for the 1999 tax year 
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C Reduction of Exemption to Account for Exempt Ro>alties Third, Unocal 
challenges the Division's reduction of the $50,000 annual exemption each >ear to account for exempt 
royalties As an example, the Division reduced Unocal's exemption for the 1995 tax year by one-eighth 
in order to account for exempt royalties paid to state and federal governments, which reduced the annual 
exemption from $50,000 to $43,750 
Unocal acknowledges that such a reduction is consistent with Rule R865-150-1(B), 
which provides that "[t]he proportion of the annual exemption an operator is entitled to shall be reduced 
by any exempt royalties " It argues, however, that the rule improperly limits the application of the statute 
authorizing the exemption Given that the Utah Supreme Court found in Sanders Bune Shrimp v Audit 
Div Of Utah State Tax Comm n, 846 P 2d 1304 (Utah 1993) that "[i]t is a long-standing principle of 
administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statutes[,]" Unocal argues 
that Rule R865-150-1(B) improperly restricts the statutory exemption and, as a result, is invalid The 
Commission disagrees Again, Section 59-5-102(2)(a) provides for a proiation of the exemption "among 
the owners in proportion to their respective mteiests in the production or in the proceeds of the 
production " Because the exempt governmental entities participate in the proceeds of the pioduction of 
the Lisbon Unit through the receipt of royalties, the Commission behe\es that the rule pioperl> 
implements the statutory exemption 
D Summary The Commission finds that Unocal has not shown that the Division 
has improperly calculated or applied the Section 59-5-102(2)(a) annual exemption for any of the yeais at 
issue Accordingly, the Commission sustains the Division's calculation of the annual exemptions that it 
applied in its assessments 
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V. 10% Failure to File Penalty for the 1998 Tax Yean 
In the Statutory Notice imposing additional severance tax for the Second Audit Period, 
the Division imposed a 10% penalty of $30,740.06 because "Unocal Corporation did not file their (sic) 
1998 annual severance tax return." The Division asks the Commission to sustain the penalty. Unocal 
asks that the penalty be abated or waived because it filed all of its quarterly returns, which contained the 
information that would have been reported on the annual return. 
Section 59-5-104 requires a producer of oil and gas to submit, on or before June 1 of each 
year, a statement or return that contains information relating to the oil and gas produced the preceding 
year. Unocal submitted a severance tax quarterly return for each of the four quarters in 1998, but did not 
submit an annual return for the 1998 tax year. The Division argues that the quarterly ^returns" are 
installments payments and that submission of these quarterly installments does not relieve the producer 
from the requirement to submit the annual return. The Commission agrees that Section 59-5-104 requires 
a producer to submit an annual return, in addition to the quarterly returns required under Utah Code Ann. 
§59-5-107. In accordance with Sections 59-5-106(1) and 59-1-401, the Commission finds that the 
Division properly imposed the 10% penalty for failure to file the 1998 annual return. 
Although a penalty is properly imposed, the Commission is authorized in Section 59-1-
401(10) to waive a penalty upon a showing of reasonable cause. Unocal filed all its quarterly returns in a 
timely fashion and appears to have filed annual returns for all years prior to 1998. Commission practice 
allows a waiver if the taxpayer has an excellent record of compliance. Unocal has such a record. For 
these reasons, the Commission grants Unocal's request to waive or abate the 10% penalty for failure to 
file the 1998 annual return. 
- 4 3 -
OWUSt 
Appeal Nos 01-0033, 04-1283 & 04-1284 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i The Commission finds that it has jurisdiction to hear Appeal Nos 04-1283 and 
04-1284 
2 The Commission finds that the Division's erroneous assumption concerning the 
location of the Lisbon Plant in relation to the Lisbon Unit does not invalidate its assessments, because it 
has not been shown that this fact would have alfected the assessments under the Division's pre-
ExxonMobil practices 
3 The Commission finds that Unocal's severance tax and conservation fees 
liabilities for all years at issue accrued prior to November 25, 2003, the date the Utah Supreme Court 
issued its ruling in ExxonMobil Furthermore, the Commission finds that the prospectivity language in 
ExxonMobil precludes it from applying the Court's interpretation of the severance tax statutes to any 
matter in this case 
4 Under the Commission's pr&-ExxonMobil practices, the Commission iejects 
Unocal's proposed use of the net-back method to value its oil and residue gas Accordingly the 
Commission sustains the Division's assessments of additional severance tax and conseivation fees on 
Unocal's oil and residue gas for all years comprising the Consolidated Audit Period 
5 The Commission finds that the limitations found in the federal regulations are 
applicable when determining value under the net-back method for Utah severance tax purposes As a 
result, the Commission rejects Unocal's net-back calculations in regards to the NGLs it pioduced during 
all tax years at issue because they do not reflect the limitations found in the federal regulations As a 
result, the Commission sustains the Division's assessment of additional severance tax on Unocal s NGLs 
for the 1994 and 1995 tax }ears However, the Commission finds that pursuant to the federal regulations, 
the DiMSion assessments of additional severance tax and conservation fees on Unocal s NGLs for the 
- 44 -
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1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 tax years should be reduced to reflect a processing allowance for actual costs 
shown up to 99% 
6. The Commission finds that Unocal has not shown that the Division improperly 
calculated or applied the Section 59-5-102(2)(a) annual exemption. Accordingly, the Commission 
sustains the annual exemptions that the Division applied in its assessments for all years comprising the 
Consolidated Audit Period. 
7. The Commission grants Unocal's request to waive or abate the 10% penalty 
assessed to Unocal for failing to file an annual severance tax return for the 1998 tax year. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission sustains the Division's assessments in full for 
the 1994 and 1995 tax years. The Division's assessments for the remaining years are also sustained with 
the following exceptions: 1) the 66 2/3% processing costs that the Division allowed against the value of 
Unocal's NGLs for tax years 1996 and 1997 should be increased to actual costs shown up to 99%, 2) the 
70% processing costs that the Division allowed against the value of Unocal's NGLs for tax years 1998 
and 1999 should also be increased to actual costs shown up to 99%; and 3) the 10% penalty the Division 
imposed for the 1998 tax year is waived. It is so ordered. 
DATED this <^Y day of * < V ^ ^ ^ ^ , 2007. 
[f-nll.C^ 
Xqja Kerry R. CJlapman 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision 
DATED this <£Y day of < S ^ £ < ^ ^ , 2007 
CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT 
I concur in part and dissent in part with my respected colleagues' majority opinion in this 
matter I concur with my colleagues' determination that Section 4 of H B 63 (1990) mandates that the 
federal regulations and the limitations prescribed in them must be considered when determining the costs 
that may be deducted in the net-back approach to establish Utah severance tax value I also concur with 
their conclusion that Unocal did not show that it considered the federal regulations when it calculated its 
proposed values for its NGLs As a result, I agree with my colleagues' valuation of Unocal's NGLs foi 
all periods at issue 
However, I dissent from my colleagues' determination that 1) the Court's prospectivity 
language in ExxonMobil precludes the Commission from applying the Court's ruling to Appeal Nfos 04-
1283 and 04-1284, which concern tax years 1998 and 1999, and 2) the Division s error concerning the 
location ot the Lisbon Plant has no effect on the Division's valuation of Unocal's oil and residue gas 
using the Commission's pre-EwonAfobil practices 
- 4 6 -
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1 Prospectivity Language in ExxonMobil First, I wish to state that the 
Commission has been placed in an unenviable position requiring it to apply the more favorable tax 
treatment prescribed in ExxonMobil to certain taxpayers in certain situations, but also to apply the less 
favorable pre-ExxonMobil practices to other taxpayers in other situations That being said, I agree that the 
prospectivity language in ExxonMobil precludes the Commission from applying the Court's ruling to 
Appeal No 01-0033, which concerns tax years 1994 through 1997 However, I disagree that the language 
precludes the Commission from applying the ruling to Appeal Nos 04-1283 and 04-1284, which concern 
tax years 1998 and 1999 
In ExxonMobil, the Court stated that except for the taxpayer in that case, its ruling would 
not apply to "refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax 
Commission" (emphasis added) I am persuaded that the word "pending" is critical in determining those 
matters to which the Commission may apply the Court's ruling I interpret the Court's language as 
requiring the application of its ruling to matters that were not yet under appeal or for which a deficiency 
assessment had not been issued on November 25, 2003, regardless of whether the taxes concerned a 
period prior to this date Otherwise, the Division could assess a deficiency for a prior tax period after 
November 25, 2003, without regard to the Court's guidance in ExxonMobil and without the taxpayer 
having a meaningful opportunity to contest the Division's action 
As a result, I would have applied the Court's guidance in ExxonMobil to those matters 
relating to the 1998 and 1999 tax years, as well Using the Court's guidance, I would have also found that 
the Division's assessments of oil and residue gas at the point of sale after processing at the Lisbon Plant 
was erroneous I do not believe contract prices at this point or posted prices that estimate a value at this 
point establishes the value of Unocal's products "in the immediate vicinity of the well" or "in a relatively 
- 4 7 -
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natural state," as required by ExxonMobil Furthermore, I believe that Unocal adequately demonstrated 
that sales near the wellhead "are not a distinct rarity," which also satisfies a factor cited in ExxonMobil 
Nevertheless, regardless of these conclusions, I may have rejected Unocal's proposed 
calculations because I am not convinced that the calculations adequately considered the federal 
regulations However, because the Commission determined in a prior case that the federal regulations 
would not be considered, I believe it is unfair of the Commission to reverse its position concerning the 
application of the federal regulations without giving Unocal an opportunity to submit new calculations 
that consider the regulations 
2 Location of Lisbon Plant As stated above, I agree that the Commission is 
required to use its pre-ExxonMobil practices to determine the value of Unocal's products for the 1994 
through 1997 tax years However, unlike my colleagues, I would have found that for these four >ears, the 
Division's erroneous assumption concerning the location of the Lisbon Plant has an effect on the value of 
Unocal's oil and residue gas Although the Division's testimony on this point appeared, at times, 
contradictory, I am persuaded that the pvz-ExxonMobil practice was to value oil and gas at the point it left 
the unit or field Because Unocal's oil and gas was processed after it left the Lisbon Unit, I believe that 
the Division's valuation of these products at a point after processing is enoneous, even it the Couit s 
guidance in ExxonMobil is not considered Again, regardless of this conclusion, I may have, nevertheless, 
rejected Unocal's calculations because I am not convinced that they adequately considered the federal 
guidelines 
D'Arcy Dixon Pi^iianelli 
Commissioner v J 
- 4 8 -
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Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A 
Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do 
not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. 
You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. §59-1-601 et seq. and §63-46b-13 et seq. 
KRC/01-0033fof,04-I283fof&04-l284fof 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RTVER GAS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
Case No. 060700437 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Pursuant to the Court's Order dated October 19, 2006 granting Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel the specific answers to discovery, Respondent, the Utah State Tax Commission, hereby 
submits supplemental discovery responses as ordered. In so doing, Respondent preserves any 
and all objections as to the admissibility of the information produced. Respondent also notes 
that this information is produced pursuant to direct Order of the Court which has been duly 
informed as to the confidential nature of information presented and as to the statutory restrictions 
on the dissemanation of such information. Having noted its ongoing objections and concerns 
regarding the disclosure of the information the Respondent hereby submits responses to 
interrogatories numbers 4 through 12, number 21, number 22, number 24, number 25 and 
number 26 as well as responses to requests for admissions numbers 1 through 12 and requests for 
production of documents numbers 6 and 7. 
DEFINITIONS 
In responding to these Interrogatories, particularly Interrogatories number 8 and 9, the 
following definitions of specific terms have been relied on by the Utah State Tax Commission 
and should be used in interpreting these responses. 
1. Gross Production - The amount of oil and gas produced by well, obtained form the Utah 
Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, attributable to the applicable lands located in Utah. 
2. Stripper Well Production - No tax is imposed upon production from stripper wells as 
defined under Section 59-5-101. 
3. Wildcat/Development Well Production - No tax is imposed upon the first six months of 
production for development wells, and the first 12 months for wildcat wells, as defined 
under Section 59-5-101. 
4. Exempt Royalty Production - Calculated at an estimated 15% rate against the volume 
remaining after deducting stripper and wildcat/development well production. 
5. Average Price - Compiled from severance tax returns filed with the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
2 
6. Tax Rates - the tax amount is calculated by applying the applicable tax rates of 3% and 
5% against the taxable value as directed under Section 59-5-102. 
7. Workover/Recompletion Credit - A tax credit of up to 20% for the expenses of a 
workover or recompletion, approved by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, is 
allowed as a deduction. The tax credit is limited to $30,000 per well during each 
calendar year. 
8. Allocation Percent - 33% of the new taxes from wells existing on or before June 30, 
1996 and 80% of the taxes from new wells beginning production on or after July 1, 1996. 
80% of taxes from new wells beginning production on or after January 1, 2001 
attributable to interests on lands conveyed to the tribe under the Ute-Moab Land 
Restoration Act. 
9. Allocation Percent - 33% of the new taxes from wells existing on or before June 30, 
1996 and 80% of the taxes from new wells beginning production on or after July 1, 1996, 
for Navajo Revitalization Fund. 
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
4. Identify the person or persons at the Tax Commission who have been responsible 
for the period July 1, 1999 to the present to calculate the amounts deposited into the Uintah 
Basin Revitalization Fund Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-116. 
RESPONSE: Ken Petersen. 
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5. Identify the person or persons at the Tax Commission who have been responsible 
for the period July 1, 1999 to the present to calculate the amounts deposited into the Navajo 
Revitalization Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119. 
RESPONSE: Ken Petersen. 
6. Identify all amounts deposited by the Tax Commission between July 1, 1999 and 
the present into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-116. 
RESPONSE. A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
$786,005 
$1,845,337 
$2,000,000 
$1,686,135 
$3,000,000 
$3,000,000 
$3,000,000 
7. Identify all amounts deposited by the Tax Commission between July 1, 1999 and 
the present into the Navajo Revitalization Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119. 
RESPONSE A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
$440,640 
$1,485,251 
$1,145,373 
$939,401 
$1,216,045 
$1,451,427 
$1,988,076 
8. Identify as specifically as practicable how the amounts in Interrogatory #6 were 
calculated. 
RESPONSE: Gross production is reduced by stripper well production, wildcat/development 
well production, and exempt royalty production to arrive at taxable volume. 
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Taxable volume is multiplied by the average price to determine taxable value. The tax 
rates are applied to the taxable value to determine the total amount of severance tax. This 
amount is then reduced by the applicable workover/recompletion credit to arrive at the total 
severance tax paid. Then the appropriate allocation percent is applied to determine the amount 
of severance taxes to be deposited into the Fund. 
9. Identify as specifically as practicable how the amounts in Interrogatory #7 were 
calculated. 
RESPONSE: Gross production is reduced by stripper well production, wildcat/development 
well production, and exempt royalty production to arrive at taxable volume. 
Taxable volume is multiplied by the average price to determine taxable value. The tax 
rates are applied to the taxable value to determine the total amount of severance tax. This 
amount is then reduced by the applicable workover/recompletion credit to arrive at the total 
severance tax paid. Then the appropriate allocation percent is applied to determine the amount 
of severance taxes to be deposited into the Fund. 
10. For the period July 1, 2000 to November 30, 2003, identify the total amount on 
your records of oil and gas production by year on lands the severance taxes from which were 
deposited into the Navajo Revitalization Fund. 
RESPONSE: The calculation is done on a calendar year basis, therefore the information 
presented below is by calendar year. 
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Oil (BBLS) Gas (MCF) 
2000 5,608,571 4,604,947 
2001 5,021,339 4,346,918 
2002 4,731,507 3,906,534 
2003 4,145,103 3,663,620 
11. For the period July 1, 2000 to November 30, 2003, identify the total amount on 
your records of oil and gas production by year on lands the severance taxes from which were 
deposited into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund. 
RESPONSE: The records of the Utah State Tax Commission for severance taxes are kept on a 
calendar year basis. The information presented below is by calendar year. 
Oil (BBLS) Gas (MCF) 
2000 2,290,085 32,693,536 
2001 2,090,550 42,456,262 
2002 2,051,743 50,582,713 
2003 2,204,754 49,148,607 
12. At the March 22, 2005 Formal Hearing before the Tax Commission in appeal no. 
00-1159, Inge-Lise Goss testified at p. 330 of the transcript that from January 1, 2004 to 
December 31, 2004, there was "an increase in the federal royalties monitored by the state" and 
that state severance tax revenues "were up slightly, but not anywhere to that same magnitude" as 
the federal royalties. Identify the specific federal royalty and state severance tax revenues 
referenced by Ms. Goss and provide any and all information that supports her testimony 
statement. 
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RESPONSE: 
Federal Royalties Severance Tax 
2003 $33,926,481 $26,745,279 
2004 $63,033,708 $36,659,808 
21. Identify how many severance tax refund claims are pending before the Tax 
Commission. 
RESPONSE. Ten. 
22. Identify the total amount of each severance tax refund claim pending before the 
Tax Commission. 
RESPONSE: $4,382,173.84. 
24. If the answer to Interrogatory #23 is yes, identify each such sale the Tax 
Commission is aware. 
RESPONSE: We are aware that title to 116,512,780 MCF of gas was transferred at wellhead 
meters for the period of 1994 tlirough 2005. This equates to $424,940,189 in value. 
25. For each sale identified in Interrogatory #24, identify whether the taxpayer 
utilized the value at the wellhead meter for severance tax purposes. 
RESPONSE Yes. 
26. For each sale identified in Interrogatory #24, identify whether the Auditing 
Division accepted the value at the wellhead meter utilized by the taxpayer as the appropriate 
value under Utah law. 
RESPONSE. Yes. 
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REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
1. Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission are issued from 
the General Fund of the State of Utah. 
RESPONSE: Tax Commission refunds are issued by State Finance. Severance tax refunds are 
issued from the General Fund of the State of Utah. 
2. Admit that for the period July 1, 1999 to the present, when the Tax Commission 
refunded severance taxes to taxpayers, the Tax Commission did not seek reimbursement for any 
portion of such refunds from the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund or the Navajo Revitalization 
Fund. 
RESPONSE: Respondent admits that it has not sought reimbursement from the Revitalization 
Funds during the period in question. 
3. Admit that the calculation of "taxes collected" under Utah Code section 59-5-116 
is based on oil and gas severance tax collections minus oil and gas severance tax refunds for the 
present year. 
RESPONSE Deny. 
4. Admit that the calculation of "taxes collected" under Utah Code section 59-5-119 
is based on oil and gas severance tax collections minus oil and gas severance tax refunds for the 
present year. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
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5. Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission will have no 
impact on the amount of money deposited into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund if the $3 
million cap in Utah Code section 59-5-116(2) is reached. 
RESPONSE: Respondent admits that if the cap is reached that severance tax refunds would not 
affect the amount of money deposited into the fund. 
6. Admit that the $3 million dollar cap was reached for the Uintah Basin 
Revitalization Fund for fiscal years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. 
RESPONSE: The Revitalization Funds are calculated on a calendar year basis because the 
severance tax is reported and paid on a calendar year. For calendar years 2003, 2004, and 2005 
the $3 million dollar cap was reached. 
7. Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission will have no 
impact on the amount of money deposited into the Navajo Revitalization Fund if the $2 million 
cap in Utah Code section 59-5-119(2) is reached. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
8. Admit that a portion of the severance taxes at issue in tax Commission case no. 
00-0901, and which were paid by ExxonMobil from July 1, 1997 to December 31, 1998, were 
deposited by the Utah State Tax Commission into the Navajo Revitalization Fund pursuant to 
Utah Code section 59-5-119. 
RESPONSE: Respondent admits that a portion of the taxes paid by ExxonMobil for the period 
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in question were eventually credited to the Navajo Revitalization Fund. However, the Tax 
Commission does not technically deposit directly into the fund. 
9. Admit that the Utah State Tax Commission issued a severance tax refund in the 
amount of $2,168,334.87, plus interest, to ExxonMobil between November 21, 2005 and January 
9, 2006 pursuant to the Tax Commission decision in case number 00-0901 dated November 21, 
2005. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
10. Admit that the severance tax refund referenced in Request for Admission #9 was 
paid from the General Fund of the State of Utah. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
11. Admit that no portion of the severance tax refund referenced in Request for 
Admission #9 was paid out of Navajo Revitalization Fund funds. 
RESPONSE: Admit that the refund check was issued solely by the State of Utah by State 
Finance. 
12. Admit that no portion of the severance tax refund referenced in Request for 
Admission #9 reduced the appropriation provided by Utah Code section 59-5-119. 
RESPONSE: Respondent admits that no portion of the refund referred to in Admission number 
9 reduced the appropriation provided by Utah Code Aim. § 59-5-119. 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
6. Produce all documents showing how the amounts in Interrogatory No. 6 were 
calculated. 
RESPONSE See attached. 
7. Produce all documents showing how the amounts in Interrogatory No. 7 were 
calculated. 
RESPONSE: See attached. 
DATED this <pir day of December, 2006. 
Clark L. Snelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
^ ^ , 3 3 U J O i 
Shelley Robi^on 
Utah State Tax Commission 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION •w""~"^'^Wton 
Petit ioners, 
AUDITING DIVISION Op THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 88-1676 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This
 m a t t e r cme b e f o r e ^ ^ g t a t e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
a formal hearing on Wednesday. May „ ,
 X 9 M . H e a t i n g t h e m a t t e c 
for and on behalf of the Tax Con^aion were R. „. Hansen, 
C h a i r s ; Joe p. p a c h eco, C o r a n i s s i o n e r ; a n d G ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Commissioner and PresiH*r.rr n « ' 
e S l d i n g 0 f f
^ e r . Present and representing the 
Petitioners were mm 
M B Present and representing the Respondent was Lee A. Deve7 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Sased upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
bearing, the Tax CommiSsioa h e r e b y mkQs i t s ; 
EINDINGS OF FACT 
l« The tax in question i s occupation tax. 
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2. The audit period in question i s January 1, 1980 
through December 31, 1986. 
(hereinafter c o l l e c t i v e l y referred to as Petitioners) are separate 
corporations, each incorporated under the laws of Delaware, Each 
a subsidiary of H H r i f l H f H H K 
4. The Petitioners owned a number of o i l and gas wells 
located within Utah. Some of those were located in what is 
to as t b ^ f l J ^ H H H f l H Field. 
The ^ | | | m | | m Field i s a gas-condensate 
reservoir. The natural gas liquids (NGl/s) produced from th i s 
f ie ld are de l ivered to a common carrier pipel ine which, in turn, 
the toflHHHiHfll^lHIHiHH^ 
6. Pursuant to a contract entered into by the 
and m H H H H H H B / ( H H H B a ( ? r e e d t 0 purchase 
the NGL's produced by the Petitioners. The price paid ^ y f l H B 
j m ^ a s based on the average monthly prices for such products as 
published by the H H H H H B Price Information Service. Prom 
that price, deductions were made for transportation, fractionation 
and marketing fees to arrive at the actual price paid by 
to the Pe t i t i oners . 
7, The amount of occupation tax paid by the Petitioners 
far the o i l and gas produced from t h e ^ H H S f l B Field was 
based upon the amount of money received fromJ((Bkmder the terms 
of the contract . 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
For purpose of c o r i n g the occupation tax, the v a l u e 
°* - i l cr , , at t ta v e l l E t a n b s t h s v a l u e e s t a b U s h M ^ a 
l°Ta"'by the value"thB -8U "ertiirt- * « • — 
" ' "
 r0i
"
iat1
' * » V - ~ (Utah cod. * » . | «»-M7C»>(h„„,. 
ggciSION AND npnT?p 
^ the present case, the Petitioners contend that the 
value at the wen
 o f t h e g a s a n d o i l W e d M ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Field
 f o r p u r p o s e , o f d e t e r n i n . n ? ^ a r a Q u n t o f Q C C U — - — 
be paid i s the net price paid b y l ^ ^ H
 t a r «.h 
*
 o y V H H M foe those products 
under the terms of the contract. 
The e m i s s i o n
 i 8 n o t p Q r s u a d e d b y t h e a r g u j n a n t s ^ 
Petxtioners.
 S e c t l o n 59-5-67(3) states: 
or betSeJn°oofflpSlilB £ h ?f£! n t a n d a.subsidiary-company, 
common parent, or b l t ^ s p n y ° r P a r r i a U v owned by a 
that spec i f i e s the S u ? J D m ? a t l l e f otherwise a f f i l ia ted 
bona f ide unless t h e J j i J
 ft?in?ralV,,aU ? D t b e d e e * e d 
proportionate to the m w „ ? f raineralG spec i f i ed i s 
value.
 I a the even? ™i n e r a l s reasonable fa i r cash 
shall determine the fair cash'EEf 8 ?* 2 ? e t a x c°™^o* 
d l c c a s h
 value of the mineral. 
Pet i t ioners argue that under this subsection, the 
contract between them a n d f l i ^ ^ M n -• 
^ • • • • m ^ f l p i s a bona fide 
™ t r . « because t ta value e s t a n „ s W by t t ) e o o n t c a o t ^ 
pcopottionate to
 t t o f , l r raartat ^ . ^ ^ 
half of the t e s t to deform ,. 
d S t e c m i n e
 «&*t*er or not a contract i s bona 
fide for purposes of $ 59-,= --
 mk 
» S3 5-67. The other half of the tes t 
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is found in S 59-S-67, which requires the value of oil and gas to 
be set Mat the well". It is this requirement that the 
Petitioners1 pricing scheme fails to satisfy, 
tinder the clear and literal meaning of S 59-5-67, "at the 
well" means the gross value of those products at the point o~r-
their removal from the well, It does not mean the price obtained 
at some point downstream after deducting aosts incurred for 
transportation, fractionation, and marketing fees, The position 
of the Petitioners also does not account for "shrinkage," or 
product which is loet in the process, hecause the quantities which 
are sold are smaller than the quantities which come through the 
meters at the top of the wells. Therefore, the Commission find6 
that the contract relied upon by the Petitioners to establish the 
value of the oil and gas produced at the wells was not a bona fide 
contract within the meaning of § 59-5-103. 
Having so decided, the Commission next turns to the issue 
of what the correct method of valuing of the oil and gas is, 
Againr S 59-5-103 provides the statutory guideline to be followed 
in making that determination, 
Under 5 59-5-103, if a bona fide contract for the 
purchase of production of oil or gas does not exist, the value of 
the oil or gas at the well is that which is established by the 
United States for royalty purposes (federal royalty method), From 
the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, it appears 
that although there was a federal lease within the field, which 
could have been used to establish the federal royalty price, the 
Qxistonce of that lease was not known at the time of the audit* 
Thus, the federal royalty method was not applied. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that 
the correct method for determining the value of the oil and gas 
removed from the veils located within t h ^ ^ B H H H H M 
Field is the federal royalty method* The Auditing Division is 
hereby ordered to adjust its audit and to compute the tax due 
based upon the federal royalty method. It is so ordered. 
DATED this „7 U' day of Q ^ 
• J ^^ytJL 1 9 9 0 , 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
TQB B# Pacheco 
"Commissioner G. Blaine Davis Commissioner w V I AX Co, ,»«•«*«•« "Nfe 7 o «*' 
&S. ^H f ^ f " P , 
tTlife a^SsSlJ? fo" HV d T a f t e r < * * d a t e <* the f in3 _ 
the date of Tilll ovleltTAt^T °Z t h i c t y ( 3 0 J d a y s a f ^ T " 
j u d i c i a l review Utah Cads 2 ^ *?« f l*?ren? C o u r t a P ^ i t i o n for 
utah Cade Ann. ss 63-46b-13(l), 63-46b-i4<2>(a>. 
>V 
PFI/jo/9045w 
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